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CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
OF A WITNESS
By M. T. MACCRIMMON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Should prior consistent out-of-court statements' of a witness be admis-
sible when the witness gives in-court testimony on the same point? In an
action for damages for negligence, when the plaintiff testifies that she was
hurt while working for the defendant, should a witness be allowed to testify
that, after the accident, the plaintiff told the witness that that accident hap-
pened at work?2 If the defendant in a criminal trial testifies, should an
exculpatory statement that he made upon being arrested be admissible?3 In a
divorce proceeding, when the wife denies a charge of adultery, should evi-
dence of a telephone conversation between the wife and a doctor in which
she denied the charge and asked the doctor to examine her be admissible? 4
At common law, these statements are inadmissable under the rule that
prohibits proof of consistent statements of a witness5 because they are thought
© Copyright, 1979, M. T. MacCrimmon.
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
I The out-of-court statements of a declarant (i.e., a person who makes a statement
based on first-hand knowledge) who is a witness may be divided into three groups:
consistent, inconsistent and supplemental. A prior inconsistent statement is in conflict
with the in-court testimony; see, for example, Deacon v. The King, [1947] S.C.R. 531,
[1947] 3 D.L.R. 772, 89 C.C.C. 1, 3 C.R. 265. A supplemental statement, on the other
hand, provides information about an event or condition that is not contained in the
in-court testimony of the witness; some examples of this are R. v. Davey (1970), 68
W.W.R. 142, [1970] 2 C.C.C. 351, 6 C.R.N.S. 288 (B.C.S.C.); Fleming v. Toronto
Ry. Co. (1911), 25 O.L.R. 317 (C.A.); and R. v. Gwozdowski (1972), 10 C.C.C. (2d)
434 (Ont. C.A.). For the purposes of this paper, however, discussion will be confined
to consistent statements, which contain essentially the same information as the sub-
sequent in-court testimony. The class of consistent statements includes a prior statement
that revives the memory of a witness. If the memory is genuinely refreshed, there are
two statements: the in-court testimony and the prior statement.
2 Jones v. South-Eastern and Chatham Ry. Cos. Managing Comm. (1918), 87
L.J.K.B. 775, 118 L.T.R. 802.
3 R. v. Keeler, [1977] 5 W.W.R. 410 (Alta. C.A.).
4 Corke v. Corke, [1958] 1 All E.R. 224 (C.A.), discussed by Cross, Some Proposals
for Reform in the Law of Evidence (1961), 24 Mod. L. Rev. 32 at 45.
5 R. v. Lillyman, [1896] 2 Q.B. 167, 74 L.T.R. 730; Jones v. South-Eastern and
Chatham Ry. Cos. Managing Comm., supra note 2; R. v. Roberts (1942), 28 Cr. App.
R. 102; Gillie v. Posho, Ltd., [1939] 2 All E.R. 196 (P.C.); The Nominal Defendant
v. Clements (1960), 104 C.L.R. 476; R. v. Neigel (1918), 39 D.L.R. 154, [1918] 1
W.W.R. 477, 29 C.C.C. 232 (Alta. C.A.); Welstead v. Brown, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 3, [1952]
I D.L.R. 465, 102 C.C.C. 46; R. v. Campbell (1978), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 6, 1 C.R. (3d) 309
(Ont. C.A.); Cross, Evidence (4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1974) at 207; Sopinka
and Lederman, The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974)
at 264; Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. IV, rev. Chadbourn (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972)
at 255, 1124; Gooderson, Previous Consistent Statements, [1968] Camb. L.J. 64; Cross,
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to be inherently unreliable as a result of their self-serving nature and the
possibility that prior out-of-court statements could be concocted to support
subsequent in-court testimony. "If a statement of that kind were admitted it
would be easy to manufacture evidence by telling your various friends, and
then calling them as witnesses to prove what you had told them." Quite apart
from this concern is the danger of unnecessary costs attributable to the recep-
tion of irrelevant testimony. "The reason for the rule appears to the Court
to be that the evidential value of such testimony is nil. Because it does not
assist in the elucidation of the matters in dispute, it is said to be inadmissible
as being irrelevant."'7 There are exceptions to the common law rule, the most
important being statements to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication," recent
complaints in sexual offences, 9 statements of identification, 10 and res gestae.11
The rule is of recent origin. Until the early 1700's it was generally
accepted that prior statements of a witness were admissible, 12 but gradually
objections to the admission of these statements were sustained, 13 and the
current common law rule has been virtually unchanged since 1794.14 Re-
cently, however, several proposals have been made to change this rule,10 and
Some Proposals for Reform in the Law of Evidence (1961), 24 Mod. L. Rev. 32 at
43-46; Grossman, An Important Exception to the Rule Against Admission of Self-
Serving Evidence (1963), 6 Crim. L.Q. 27.
6Jones v. South-Eastern and Chatham Ry. Cos. Managing Comm., id. at 778
(L.J.K.B.), 805 (L.T.R.) per Swinfen Eady L.J.
7 R. v. Roberts, supra note 5, at 105. Also see the judgment of Morris L.J. in
Corke v. Corke, supra note 4.
8 See infra, notes 59-103 and accompanying text.
9 See infra, notes 104-84 and accompanying text.
10 See infra, notes 185-265 and accompanying text.
11 A discussion of res gestae is beyond the scope of this paper. See the text accom-
panying note 58, infra.
12Freind's Trial (1696), 13 St. Tr. 1 at 32; Squire's Trial (1753), 19 St. Tr. 262
at 270.
13 See Halliday v. Sweeting, discussed in The Case of the Borough of Ivelchester,
[1775] 3 Doug. El. Cases 151 at 163. (The plaintiff could not call the wife and sister
of the witness to testify that the witness had told the same thing to them. No reasons
are given.) Also see Wigmore, supra note 5, Vol. V, (1974) at 12-28, 1364.
14 R. v. Hardy (1794), 24 St. Tr. 199 at 1093.
15 See Model Code of Evidence (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1942)
[hereinafter Model Code]. Rule 503 provides:
Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant
(a) is unavailable as a witness, or
(b) is present and subject to cross-examination.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee Eleventh Report, Evidence (General) (Cmnd. 4991,
1972) [hereinafter Eleventh Report] provides, at 190:
s. 31(1) In any proceedings a statement made, whether orally or in a document
or otherwise, by any person shall ... be admissible as evidence of any fact stated
therein of which direct oral evidence by him would be admissible, if-
(a) he has been or is to be called as a witness in the proceedings....
Also see New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report on the Rule against
Hearsay (1978), 29 L.R.C. at 232. Draft Bill s. 66(1) (b) admits out-of-court state-
ments notwithstanding "(b) that any person concerned in the making of the statement
is a witness, whether or not he gives testimony consistent or inconsistent with the
statement. .. ."
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the rule has been abolished in civil proceedings in England. 6 This paper will
discuss the common law rule and propose a framework for evaluating pro-
posals for reform; the proposals that will be examined in detail are those of
the Law Reform Commission of Canada and the Ontario Law Reform
Commission.
II. AN INCLUSIONARY RULE
The Law Reform Commission of Canada issued its Report on Evidence
and Draft Evidence Code in 1975.17 The Commission recommends that all
previous statements of a witness be admissible if they "would be admissible
if made by [the declarant] while testifying as a witness." Therefore, admissi-
bility depends on other rules of evidence not under discussion here, such as
the rules governing testimonial competence and hearsay. The common law
rule against the admission of prior statements of a witness is abolished and
the provision makes inconsistent and consistent statements admissible to
support or attack credibility if they are relevant to that issue. 18 Thus, con-
sistent statements generally will be admissible without the necessity of satis-
fying the criteria of a common law exception, such as statements to rebut the
allegation of recent fabrication.
In the following section, the admission of consistent statements of a
witness to support credibility will be discussed first, and then the question of
whether consistent statements should be admissible as substantive evidence
will be considered.
16 Civil Evidence Act 1968, c. 64 (U.K.):
s. 2(l) In any civil proceedings a statement made, whether orally or in a docu-
ment or otherwise, by any person, whether called as a witness in those
proceedings or not, shall, subject to this section and to rules of court,
be admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein of which direct oral
evidence by him would be admissible.
(2) Where in any civil proceedings a party desiring to give a statement in
evidence by virtue of this section has called or intends to call as a witness
in the proceedings the person by whom the statement was made, the
statement
(a) shall not be given in evidence by virtue of this section on behalf of
that party without the leave of the court; and
(b) without prejudice to paragraph (a) above, shall not be given in
evidence by virtue of this section on behalf of that party before the
conclusion of the examination-in-chief of the person by whom it was
made, except(i) where before that person is called the court allows evidence
of the making of the statement to be given on behalf of that
party by some other person; or -
(ii) in so far as the court allows the person by whom the state-
ment was made to narrate it in the course of his examination-
in-chief on the ground that to prevent him from doing so
would adversely affect the intelligibility of his evidence.
17Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence, 1975, reproduced in
(1976), 34 C.R.N.S. 26 [hereinafter Canada Evidence Code].
18 id., s. 62 provides: "Any party, including the party calling him, may examine
a witness and introduce other relevant evidence for the purpose of attacking or support-
ing his credibility, except as otherwise provided in this Code."
1979]
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A. Credibility
The objection most often raised at common law to the admission of
consistent statements is that they are self-serving. There is a danger of fabri-
cated evidence. "[T]he presumption ... is, that no man would declare any-
thing against himself, unless it were true; but that every man, if he was in a
difficulty, or in the view to any difficulty, would make declarations for him-
self."' 9 The validity of this criticism is questionable. First, while it applies
only to parties in the case, the rule excludes consistent statements of all
witnesses. Second, a rule that prevents the admission of self-serving state-
ments on the basis that otherwise a party could make evidence on his own
behalf rests on an assumption that parties are liable to be motivated by their
own interest to such an extent that they will present false evidence. The
proposition that parties are so biased in their own favour that their testimony
is of no value has been discredited for over a hundred years. The disquali-
fication of witnesses because of interest was abolished in 1851.20 In any
event, it should also be noted that, even if the consistent statement were
fabricated, the prior statement and the in-court testimony would be substan-
tially identical. The declarant would be subjected to contemporaneous cross-
examination on the in-court statement and to subsequent cross-examination
on the prior statement, unless the prior statement was proved by a third party
and it was impossible to recall the declarant. 21
A more substantial objection is that in most cases a prior consistent
statement, although logically relevant on the issue of the credibility of the
witness, 22 is of slight probative value. The in-court testimony based on the
present memory of the witness and subject to contemporaneous cross-examin-
ation is usually better evidence than the prior statement. A minority of the
English Law Reform Committee that recommended the provisions of the Civil
Evidence Act 1968 were of the opinion that admission of out-of-court state-
ments when the declarant is a witness was "a departure from the 'best evidence'
principle for which there is no sufficient justification. If the previous statement
is consistent with what the witness says in court, it is of little value;...,,13
While it is more likely that a witness who is truthful will make a con-
sistent statement than a witness who is untruthful, evidence that is logically
19 R. v. Hardy, supra note 14, at 1093 per Eyre C.B.
20 The Evidence Act 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 99, s. 2 (U.K.) made parties com-
petent and compellable witnesses. See Middleton, Admissibility of Self-Serving Declara-
tion (1959-60), 14 Ark. L. Rev. 105 at 110.
21 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law of Evidence (Toronto:
Ministry of the Attorney-General, 1976) at 47 [hereinafter Ontario Report or Ontario
Draft Act].
22 Martin B. in Sheen v. Bumpstead (1862), 7 L.T.N.S. 466 at 468 (Ex. Ct.),
defines relevant evidence as "all facts and circumstances which afford a fair presumption
or ... aid the jury in arriving at a just and true conclusion." Justice Learned Hand, in
U.S. v. Sherman, 171 F. 2d 619 at 622 (2d Cir. 1948), concluded: "[M]ost persons
would probably consider any earlier consistent account, in some measure at least, con-
firmatory of a witness's testimony. The reason for its exclusion is because it has not
been made on oath rather than because it has no probative value, although courts have
often spoken as though it had none."
23 Law Reform Committee, Thirteenth Report, Hearsay Evidence in Civil Proceed-
ings (Cmnd. 2964, 1966) at 17.
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relevant, such as a consistent statement,2 4 may not be legally relevant. The
courts do not always distinguish between evidence that is inadmissible because
it is logically relevant and evidence that is logically relevant but inadmissible
on a policy ground, e.g., that it would confuse the issues, waste time or be
prejudicial. Consistent statements have been deemed to be legally irrelevant
not because they are logically irrelevant, but because their slight probative
value does not justify the danger of a multiplication of issues and a waste of
time. Sellers L.J. in Corke v. Corke and Cooke concluded: "Whether or not
this rule is strictly logical, it is one which keeps the evidence to the main
issues .... "25
A general exclusionary rule, however, can result in the loss of valuable
information, information that would change the outcome of the trial. In
Corke, a husband brought a petition for divorce on the ground of adultery.
The wife denied the charge and offered evidence that immediately after the
alleged act of adultery she had called a doctor and asked him to examine her
and the co-respondent in order to establish her innocence. Morris L.J., dis-
senting, was of the opinion that the prior consistent statement to the doctor
should have been admissible because it was logically relevant. He concluded
that it should have been one of "all the many facts and circumstances which
[the trial judge] could review and have in mind when deciding the issue .... -26
Logically probative evidence will not be lost under a rule that generally
admits consistent statements, but the admission of evidence of slight probative
value may result in such unjustified costs as delay and multiplication of issues.
Under a general inclusionary rule, there are two alternative procedures to
avoid these costs. The court can be given a discretion either to admit or to
exclude statements of slight probative value. The Civil Evidence Act 1968
admits prior consistent statements with the leave of the court. The Law
Reform Committee in its Thirteenth Report, which recommended the adop-
tion of this provision, concluded that the trial judge would only admit state-
ments that "appear to him to be likely to assist in ascertaining the truth," and,
in most cases, "[a] proof of evidence taken from a witness for the pur-
poses of the trial is of small probative value and they would not normally ex-
pect a judge to admit it, except in rebuttal of suggestions made in cross-
examination. '27
The second method of avoiding unjustified costs is to rely on the common
lav rule of relevancy. A general inclusionary rule would be subject to the
requirement that the evidence must be legally relevant. An assessment of legal
relevancy allows a judge to consider matters in addition to the question of
24 See Lempert, Modeling Relevance (1977), 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021. He defines
"logically relevant" in terms of the likelihood ratio of Bayes' Theorem. Does the prob-
ability of finding that evidence, given one hypothesis such as "the defendant is guilty,"
differ from the probability of finding that evidence, given another hypothesis such as
"the defendant is innocent"? If the probability of finding an item of evidence is the
same whether the defendant is guilty or innocent, then the evidence is logically irrelevant.
25 Corke v. Corke, supra note 4, at 235.
26 Id. at 234. The trial judge had stated that it was the evidence of the consistent
statement that tipped the scales in favour of the defendant.
27 Thirteenth Report, supra note 23, at 17.
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whether the evidence renders an event more probable, 28 such as whether it
is too remote and/or raises the possibility of a multiplication of issues. A
statutory discretion to exclude consistent statements is not necessary-the
common law rule is an adequate safeguard against unnecessary costs. The
Canada Evidence Code codifies the common law rule by providing that a
consistent statement is admissible subject to the trial judge's discretion to
exclude evidence if the "probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or undue
consumption of time." ' 9 In regard to the common law rule on consistent
statements, the Commission concludes:
The basis for rejecting such evidence is apparently its superfluity and the danger
that witnesses may manufacture such evidence. These seem to be matters that can
more sensibly be dealt with by means of the judge's general discretion to exclude
evidence that involves undue waste of time (section 5), and by the ability of
counsel to cross-examine. Thus the existing inflexible rule is abolished.- o
B. Substantive Evidence
Should consistent statements be admitted as substantive evidence? The
issue is whether there is any reason for perpetuating the subtle distinction
between evidence going to credibility and evidence admissible for the truth
of its contents. It is submitted that if the statement is admissible to support
credibility, it should be admissible as substantive evidence. Since the state-
ment is substantially the same as the in-court testimony, there is no reason
to restrict the use of the statement to supporting the credibility of the witness.
The inadmissibility of prior consistent statements is grounded, in part
at least, on their characterization as hearsay, although the strict formulation
of the common law hearsay rule probably did not define prior consistent
statements of a witness as hearsay. There are few judicial formulations of
the hearsay rule, and none of them is comprehensive. One frequently quoted
formulation appears in Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor:
Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called
as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the
object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the state-
ment. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the
evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.,'
Phipson defined hearsay in 1902, stating: "Oral or written statements made
by persons not called as witnesses . . . [are] inadmissible to prove the truth
of the matters stated .... ,,32 Both definitions refer to statements of a person
who is not called as a witness.
In addition to the rule against hearsay, there is a common law rule
against "narrative," or what is sometimes referred to as "the rule against
self-serving evidence." The rule against narrative prevented a witness from
testifying as to his prior statement:
[T]he witness may not repeat to the court of his own previous narratives or state-
28 See Eggleston, "The Relationship Between Relevance and Admissibility in the
Law of Evidence," in Glass, ed., Seminars on Evidence (Sydney: New South Wales
Bar Ass'n, 1970) at 53.
29 Canada Evidence Code, supra note 17, s. 5.
3o ld. at 100.
31 [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965 (P.C.).
32 Phipson, Law of Evidence (3d ed. London: Stevens and Haynes, 1902) at 187.
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ments concerning the relevant facts made to other persons out of court; when he
is in the witness-box he must take his mind back directly, so to speak, to the facts
he is called to prove, and must give to the court his present recollection of
those facts.33
English authority thus supports the proposition that prior statements of
a witness did not come within the common law definition of hearsay. There
were two separate rules: first, the "strict" rule, which excluded statements
of a witness who did not testify, and second, the rule against narrative.
3 4
In contrast, the Americans have adopted the view that all prior state-
ments of a witness are hearsay. Wigmore describes the rule against prior
statements of a witness as a later step in the development of the hearsay
rule, noting, in reference to the "debate as to the sufficiency of witnesses in
number and kind," that "doubt began to be thrown on the propriety of de-
pending on extra-judicial assertions, either alone or as confirming other testi-
mony given in court."35 McCormick, in reference to inconsistent statements
of a witness, concludes:
The reason for the orthodox view that a previous statement of the witness,
though admissible to impeach, is not evidence of the facts stated, is clear and
obvious. When used for that purpose, the statement is hearsay. Its value rests
on the credit of the declarant, who was not under oath nor subject to cross-
examination, when the statement was made.36
Modem definitions of hearsay have combined the strict rule against
hearsay and the rule against narrative, and the distinction made at common
law in England has not been preserved. The 1976 edition of Phipson defines
the rule against hearsay thus: "Former statements of any person whether or
not he is a witness in the proceedings, may not be given in evidence if the
purpose is to tender them as evidence of the truth of the matters asserted
in them. . .. ,,"7 Cross, in his fourth edition, enunciates the hearsay rule as
follows: "[A] statement other than one made by a person while giving oral
evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact stated.3 8
33 Wills, The Law of Evidence (3d ed. London: Stevens and Sons, 1894) at 94,
quoted in Gooderson, supra note 5, at 64.
34 Cross, Evidence, supra note 5, at 6-7.
35 Wigmore, supra note 5, Vol. V, (1974) at 17, 1364.
36 McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence
(1946-47), 25 Tex. L. Rev. 573 at 575.
37 Phipson, On Evidence (12th ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1976) at 263, 625.
38 Cross, Evidence, supra note 5, at 6. Also see Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 801(c), 28
U.S.C.A.:
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
The English Civil Evidence Act 1968, c. 64, s. 1 provides:
In any civil proceedings a statement other than one made by a person while giving
oral evidence in those proceedings shall be admissible as evidence of any fact
stated therein to the extent that it is so admissible by virtue of any provision
of this Part of this Act or by virtue of any other statutory provision or by agree-
ment of the parties, but not otherwise.
Estey J., in Mclnroy v. The Queen (1979), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 609 at 630-31, 5 C.R. (3d)
125 at 149-50 (S.C.C.), questions whether a prior statement of a witness narrated by
that witness at trial is hearsay. He points out that "The hearsay rule is generally illus-
trated in cases where the statement in question is made by a third party not in the witness
box to the witness .. " and quotes Archbold, who asserts that the definition of Cross
in his fourth edition does not exclude a witness's own prior statements. Archbold, how-
ever, is referring to the strict definition of hearsay, not to the conclusion of Cross that
1979]
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A prior statement comes within these definitions even if the witness testifies
as to his own prior statement; that is, it is not one "made by a witness in
these proceedings," but is a statement made at another time. The in-court
statement is of the form "I said X at that time." X is not treated as a state-
ment made while the witness is testifying, and it is hearsay if offered as
evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. This is illustrated by the cases
that hold that an accused cannot testify as to his exculpatory statements to
the police unless they come within an exception to the rule against narrative,
and even then they are not substantive evidence unless they are part of
the res gestae.39
Whether there are two separate rules is of no practical significance since
the effect of both rules is the exclusion of out-of-court statements as proof
of the matter asserted. Prior statements of a witness are generally inadmis-
sible. Only one of the exceptions to this rule or rules-the res gestae excep-
tion-admits statements as proof of the matter asserted. The other exceptions
confine the use of the statement to attacking or supporting credibility. This
point was stated clearly in R. v. Lillyman by Hawkins J., who said, in refer-
ence to evidence of a consistent statement of the prosecutrix in a rape charge:
It clearly is not admissible as evidence of the facts complained of: those facts
must be established, if at all, upon oath by the prosecutrix or other credible
witness, and, strictly speaking, evidence of them ought to be given before evi-
dence of the complaint is admitted. The complaint can only be used as evidence
of the consistency of the conduct of the prosecutrix with the story told by her
in the witness-box, and as being inconsistent with her consent to that of which
she complains. 40
The multiple definitions of hearsay can be categorized in terms of two
polar types: "(1) those which focus on the type of statement and the purpose
for which it is offered, and (2) those which focus on purported defects in
testimony classified as hearsay."'" The definitions quoted above are of the
first category. For the purposes of analysing whether prior consistent state-
ments should be admissible as substantive evidence, one should concentrate
on the definition that emphasizes the hearsay dangers. Hearsay evidence is
generally excluded because the trier of fact is not able to view the demeanour
of the witness at the time the statement is made, or to see contemporaneous
cross-examination of the witness on the statement. The statement usually will
not be made under oath.42 The accuracy of the statement depends on the
this strict definition and the rule against narrative should be combined in the final formu-
lation of the rule. A conclusion that inconsistent statements may not have been hearsay
according to the strict common law definition does not imply that inconsistent statements
narrated by the witness are admissible as substantive evidence.
39 Thus, Martin J.A., in R. v. Campbell, supra note 5, held that even the accused
could not testify as to his prior statements.
40 Supra note 5, at 170 (Q.B.), 731 (L.T.R.).
41Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence (St. Paul: West Pub-
lishing Co., 1977) at 338.
42 As Estey J. concludes in McInroy v. The Queen, supra note 38 at 630 (D.L.R.),
149-50 (C.R.), the "presence or absence of an oath on the occasion of the prior state-
ment does not appear to be the critical test" in deciding whether hearsay evidence is
admissible. Thus, former testimony of a witness is inadmissible. In the Earl of Pembroke's
Trial (1678), 6 St. Tr. 1309 at 1338, a physician offered his prior deposition before a
magistrate. The Court held: "[Y]ou must give it again viva voce; we must not read your
examination before the Court."
[VOL. 17, No. 2
Consistent Statements of a Witness
accuracy of the belief of the declarant and the intention of the declarant to
communicate that belief correctly. Contemporaneous cross-examination sub-
jects a witness to scrutiny as to his perception, memory and sincerity. Any
ambiguity as to how the witness interprets words can be removed. The ques-
tion is whether the fact that the declarant is a witness will provide sufficient
information on the reliability of the prior statement to enable the trier of fact
to evaluate the reliability of the statement correctly. Since the declarant has
given the same statement on oath and will be subject to cross-examination
on both statements, the reliability of the statement can be evaluated. Any
motivation to misrepresent can be taken into account by the trier of fact in
assigning weight to the evidence. The California Evidence Code commentary
remarks that: "It is not realistic to expect a jury to understand that it cannot
believe that a witness was telling the truth on a former occasion even though it
believes the same story given at the hearing is true."'43 It appears to be ac-
cepted generally that the instruction on credibility is a verbal ritual that is not
understood by the jury.44 In reality, the distinction is inconsequential. Since
there already is an in-court statement on the point, it will be impossible to
determine what effect the jury has given the previous statement if the proper
direction is given.45 It may be noted that under the current rules on corrobora-
tion, consistency is not corroboration. 46 Whether a consistent statement ad-
mitted as substantive evidence under a rule such as the Canada Evidence
Code could corroborate other evidence is a question to be discussed in
relation to an analysis of the corroboration rule and is not a determining
factor in the selection of a rule on the admission of consistent statements as
substantive evidence.47
III. AN EXCLUSIONARY RULE
At common law, the rule against the introduction of consistent state-
ments of a witness, either as substantive evidence or to support credibility,
was subject to some universally accepted exceptions. In order to be admis-
sible, the statement had to serve a further function such as the rehabilitation
of the witness or the presentation of more reliable evidence. Statements were
admissible to rehabilitate a witness after an allegation of recent fabrication
43 West's Ann. Evid. Code § 1236. Also see McCormick, supra note 36, at 580;
People v. Alcalde, 148 P. 2d 627 (Cal. S.C. 1944).
44 Per Rand J. in Deacon v. The King, supra note 1, at 537-38 (S.C.R.), 777-78
(D.L.R.), 6-7 (C.C.C.), 270-71 (C.R.); R. v. Ledrew, [1945] 1 D.L.R. 453 (N.S.C.A.);
U.S. v. DeSisto, 329 F. 2d 929 (2nd Cir. 1964), certiorari denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
Also see McCormick, id. at 580.
45 Unless a trial judge makes a specific reference in his reasons to the statement
that implies that he has given some weight to the previous statement. See Young v.
Denton, [1927] 1 D.L.R. 426 (Sask. C.A.). A document that had revived the memory
of the witness was not admissible as evidence. The judge indicated in his reasons that
he had given weight to the statement in the document in reaching his decision.
40 Thlomas v. The Queen, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 344, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 306, 103 C.C.C.
193, 15 C.R. 1.
47 See, for example, Ontario Draft Act, supra note 21, s. 28, which provides that
a consistent statement admitted to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication "shall not
be taken as corroborative of the evidence of the witness who has made the statement,"
where corroboration is required by law.
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or in sexual cases where it was thought that an adverse inference as to credi-
bility arose naturally from the situation. In Canada and England, prior identi-
fications were also admitted to rehabilitate, since an identification made for
the first time at trial was suspect. In the case of res gestae, statements that
presented more reliable evidence were admitted. In England, there is some
authority supporting the reception of prior consistent statements of an accused
who gives evidence, but this authority has not been followed in Canada 4 8
The Ontario Law Reform Commission issued its Report on the Law of
Evidence in 1976.41 The Report examined the present law of evidence in
Ontario in civil proceedings, in prosecution for provincial offences and, "to
the extent that such proceedings are not governed by the provisions of other
Acts, of the rules of evidence in proceedings before tribunals or investigatory
bodies acting under statutory authority." 50 The majority of its recommenda-
tions are contained in a Draft Evidence Act, which is included in the Report.
The Ontario Draft Act is not a codification of all the rules of evidence,
but a modification of selected common law rules. The Ontario Commission
concluded:
We have thought it desirable to codify some of the common law, but we do not
think it would be wise to attempt to prepare an exhaustive and comprehensive
code of evidence. In our view, this would give rise to a whole new course ofjudicial interpretation creating much uncertainty about the precise meaning of
words and phrases used in such a code, a development which could seriously
disrupt the administration of justice.51
The Report recommends only two modifications to the common law rule
against the admission of consistent statements of a witness. At common law,
consistent statements admissible to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication
are only evidence to support credibility and are not evidence of the truth
of the matters asserted.52 The Draft Act provides that statements admissible
to "rebut a suggestion that his [a witness's] evidence as given at the trial has
been fabricated" are admissible to support credibility and "as evidence of any
fact contained therein of which direct oral evidence by him would be admis-
sible."'53 A statement admitted under this provision cannot be used to fulfil
a legal requirement of corroboration.
The other recommendation of the Commission relates to res gestae. At
common law statements, including prior consistent statements of a witness,
that are part of the res gestae are admissible,54 but there may be some doubt
48 Gooderson, supra note 5, at 66. McDermid J.A. in R. v. Keeler, supra note 3,
at 415, concluded: "Whatever the English practice may be, I have concluded that, in
Canada, what the accused said upon arrest is not admissible by the accused by calling
the person to whom it was made unless it is part of the res gestae or is called to rebut
a suggestion of recent fabrication."
49 Supra note 21.
50 Id. atix.
51 Id. atxi.
52 See, for example, R. v. Lillyman, supra note 5.
53 Ontario Report, supra note 21, at 54, and Ontario Draft Act, s. 28.
54 See, for example, R. v. Graham, [1974] S.C.R. 206, 26 D.L.R. (3d) 579, [1972]
4 W.W.R. 488, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 93; and Gooderson, Res Gestae in Criminal Cases, [1956]
Camb. LJ. 199 and [1957] Camb. L.J. 55.
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about whether in Canada the exception admits spontaneous or contemporane-
ous statements. 55 The Draft Act provides that statements made "in such
conditions of spontaneity or contemporaneity in relation to an event perceived
by the witness as to exclude the probability of concoction or distortion" are
admissible whether or not a person is called as a witness in the proceedings.s
This provision admits, among other statements, spontaneous consistent state-
ments of a witness.
The Commission does not give any reasons for its decision to preserve
the common law exclusionary rule. The justification for the recommendation
on statements to rebut recent fabrication is that these statements are relevant
to credibility and "the witness is on the witness stand and available to testify
to the facts contained in the statement." 57 This is true, however, of all con-
sistent statements, since in every case the witness has given in-court testimony
on the same point.
As described above, the common law rule that consistent statements are
not admissible was subject to certain exceptions. The following sections of
the paper will discuss the exceptions for recent fabrication, recent complaints
in sexual cases and prior identification. The reception of statements under
the res gestae exception will not be discussed because the justification for their
admission differs from the other exceptions to the rule against consistent
statements. It is not a necessary condition for the res gestae exception that
there be consistent in-court testimony on the same point. Since the exception
also admits supplemental statements 58 and statements of an unavailable wit-
ness, the reliability of the statement is more important than is the case with
prior consistent statements.
A. Recent Fabrication
At common law, consistent statements are admissible to rebut an allega-
tion that the evidence of the witness had been recently fabricated. 59 A state-
ment to the same effect as the in-court testimony made at a time "sufficiently
early to be inconsistent with the suggestion that the account is a late invention
or reconstruction"G0 was thought to be legally probative contra the suggestion
of recent fabrication. This principle is not challenged by law reformers; rather
they question whether the exception should be expanded.
The Ontario Draft Act provides:
s. 28(1) A previous consistent statement made by a witness in a proceeding is
admissible in evidence to rebut an allegation that his evidence has been fabricated,
and such a statement shall be admitted not only to support the credibility of that
55 Cf. Gilbert v. The King (1907), 38 S.C.R. 284, 12 C.C.C. 127; and Ratten v.
The Queen, [1972] A.C. 378, [1971] 3 All E.R. 801.
50 Ontario Draft Act, s. 28; and Ontario Report, supra note 21, at 38.
57 Ontario Report, id. at 54.
58 See note 1, supra, and Gooderson, supra note 54.
59 R. v. Neigel, supra note 5; R. v. Wannebo, [1972] 5 W.W.R. 372, 7 C.C.C. (2d)
266 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Giraldi (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 248 (B.C.C.A.); The Nominal
Defendant v. Clements, supra note 5.
0 The Nominal Defendant v. Clements, id. at 479.
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
witness, but also as evidence of any fact contained therein of which direct oral
evidence by him would be admissible.
The common law rule that admits these statements to support credibility
will be discussed in conjunction with the first part of the provision. The
second part of the provision, which would admit consistent statements as
substantive evidence, will be discussed in the next section.
1. Kinds of Allegations
There is some question as to the form of allegation that permits admis-
sion of a consistent statement. In Fox v. General Medical Council, Lord
Radcliffe, in reference to the rule admitting statements to rebut an allegation
of recent fabrication, notes: "Its application must be within limits, a matter
of discretion, and its range can only be measured by the reported instances,
not in themselves many, in which it has been successfully invoked." 1
The basic allegation is that the witness's testimony was invented at or
after a particular time, and may be expressed by alleging that there is a
motive to deceive62 or that some persuasion or influence has been brought
to bear upon the witnessG2 or that the witness did not speak when it was
natural to do So. 64 If any of these allegations is made, a statement made at a
time when these influences did not exist, or before or at the time when it was
natural to speak, is admissible to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication. 5
The issue is whether at a particular time the witness said what he is now
saying at the trial. As will be discussed, the allegation need not be made
expressly, but may be implied by the conduct and circumstances of the case. 0
The first two kinds of allegations may be grouped under the heading of bias.
a) Bias
At common law, prior statements are admissible to rehabilitate a witness
if there is an allegation that the witness is influenced by bias or some other
improper motive. In these circumstances, a consistent statement would be
logically probative, since a statement made before the improper influence
implies that the in-court testimony was free of that influence. In Fox v.
General Medical Council, Lord Radcliffe gives the example of a witness who
had testified that a will was forged and had been cross-examined with a view
61 [1960] 3 All E.R. 225 at 230 (P.C.).
02 The Nominal Defendant v. Clements, supra note 5, at 494. One kind of allega-
tion that will bring the exception into operation is that the witness's testimony "was
the result of some motive, bias, influence or moral duress operating from some particular
time and not before." Flanagan v. Fahty, [1918] 2 I.R. 361; Fox v. General Medical
Council, id.
03 The Nominal Defendant v. Clements, id.; R. v. Oyesiku (1972), 56 Cr. App.
R. 240.
64R. v. Neigel, supra note 5; R. v. Giraldi, supra note 59; R. v. Racine (1977),
32 C.C.C. (2d) 468 (Ont. C.A.).
05 Cf. Box v. California Date Growers Ass'n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 146, 57 Cal. App. 3d
264 (4th Dist. 1976). When the defendant alleged that the witness was not in a position
to be able to observe the accident accurately, there was no allegation of recent fabrication.
06 See infra, notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
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to showing that he was biased because of enmity between him and the bene-
ficiary of the propounded will. Lord Radcliffe concludes:
He [the witness] was allowed to call confirmatory evidence to show that before
the cause of this enmity had arisen he had told a third party the story he was
now telling. In that situation the issue raised by cross-examination was clearly
defined: a recent invention due to a specified cause, and if the witness could
show that his account had been the same before the cause existed he was certainly
adding a relevant fact in support of his credibility.67
The Ontario Draft Act does not provide explicitly for admission in this
case. In contrast, in the United States, the Federal Rules of Evidence 8 admit
consistent statements if there has been "an express or implied charge against
him [the witness] of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive."6 9
The California Evidence Code also states that a prior statement is admissible
if there has been a charge that the testimony is "influenced by bias or other
improper motive." 70 In the interests of clarity, the codified rule on recent
fabrication should include statements to rebut a charge that the testimony is
influenced by improper motive or bias.
b) Failure to Speak
(1) Current Law
In The Nominal Defendant v. Clements, Windeyer J. of the High Court
of Australia quotes the following statement from Commonwealth v. Jenkins:
Another similar class of decisions, resting on a like principle, is also to be dis-
tinguished from the case at bar, namely, when an attempt is made to impeach the
credit of a witness by showing that he formerly withheld or concealed the facts
to which he has now testified. In such cases it is competent to show that the
witness, at an early day, as soon as a disclosure could reasonably have been made,
did declare the facts to which he has testified.71
While Windeyer J. qualifies this ground by adding that the failure to speak
must be made the basis for a suggestion that the witness has invented his
testimony since that occasion, it must be remembered that this suggestion
may be implied. Dixon C.J., in the same case, notes that "counsel himself
may proceed with a subtlety which is the outcome of caution in pursuing
67 Fox v. General Medical Council, supra note 61, at 231. See also R. v. Campbell,
supra note 5.
08 The Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C.A., came into effect on July 1, 1975
as Public Law No. 93-595. They were the result of several drafts. The Supreme Court
of the United States in 1972 approved a set of evidence rules [reproduced in 56 F.R.D.]
that had been developed by an Advisory Committee appointed under the auspices of
the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
They are based on the work of the California Law Revision Commission, which pro-
duced the California Evidence Code, and on the work of the American Law Institute
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws who had pro-
duced the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, respectively.
In 1974, the House of Representatives produced a modified version of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. This draft was then modified to some extent by the Senate. These
two drafts went to a conference committee which produced the compromise version
that was enacted in December, 1974 to come into effect on July 1, 1975.
09 Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 801 (d) (1) (B), 28 U.S.C.A.
70 West's Annotated California Codes, Evidence Code, s. 791.
71 Supra note 5, at 494.
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what may prove a dangerous course. '' 72 In R. v. Neigel, a murder case, a
Crown witness, Fieger, testified that the accused had confessed to him that
he had poisoned his wife. He was asked on cross-examination whether he
had ever mentioned to anyone what the accused had told him and whether
he had told a contradictory story to two particular people. Upon his denial
that he had told these two people anything about the accused, he was asked
why he did not tell them about the accused's statement. The Alberta Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the trial judge to admit a statement made by
Fieger to his father that was consistent with Fieger's testimony. The Court
followed the Irish case of R. v. Coil, in which the witness was cross-examined
on an earlier statement in which he did not mention the accused." The
witness was permitted to give evidence that he had mentioned the accused's
name at an even earlier date.
This situation is not always identified expressly. In R. v. Giraldi, the
statement that an accused made the morning after his arrest, explaining his
possession of a stolen van, was admitted. 74 There was no implied allegation
that the defence was raised subsequent to the statement to the police officer,
or that there was a motive to deceive at the time of the statement. While the
British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had properly
"concluded that the Crown would contend or the jury itself might consider
the respondent's testimony to have been concocted by him or for him after
he found himself under arrest," the Court does not examine whether the
statement would rebut an allegation of recent fabrication. 5 The case can be
explained on the basis that the Crown was alleging implicitly that the accused
did not speak when it was natural to do so.76
(2) Reform: Statements of an Accused
Once the allegation of a failure to speak when it is natural to do so is
recognized as a basis of an inference that testimony is contrived, the question
arises whether there should be a general rule for admitting statements of
72 The Nominal Defendant v. Clements, supra note 5, at 480.
73 (1889), 24 L.R.I. 522. Also see R. v. Benjamin (1913), 8 Cr. App. R. 146,
where the witness was cross-examined about a failure to mention a detail in a state-
ment. He was allowed to refer to an entry in his notebook in order to rebut the allega-
tion of recent contrivance. Martin J.A., in R. v. Campbell, supra note 5, notes, at 20
(C.C.C.), 326 (C.R.), in reference to the situation in which the "failure of witness to
mention some circumstance on an earlier occasion when he might have done so, is
made the basis for a suggestion that he had invented the story since that occasion,"
that it is open to the witness to introduce evidence "that on the very occasion on which
it is suggested he omitted to mention the circumstances, he did, in fact, speak of it."
74 Supra note 59.
75 Id. at 253.
76 Also see R. v. Racine, supra note 64. On a charge of conspiracy to kidnap, the
statements that two accomplices had made to the police upon their arrest naming the
accused were admitted on direct examination. While the Court did not examine the
particular circumstances, it stated, at 472, that "iIt was one of the principal defences
urged on behalf of the accused before the jury that the Crown's case was dependent on
the testimony of 'tainted witnesses,"' and concluded that an attack would be made on
the credibility of the witness on the basis that the testimony had been recently fabri-
cated or contrived. The implication is that a truthful witness would have spoken at
the first opportunity.
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particular kinds of witnesses. Presently, all recent complaints of victims of
sexual offences are admissible without a requirement that an allegation of con-
trivance arise from the particular case. But what about an accused? Is there
always an implication that an innocent person would have given an explana-
tion at the time of arrest? The cases emphasize that there is currently no
general rule that it is natural to speak in certain defined situations and that,
therefore, an explanation at that time is admissible. Rather it is "the particular
circumstances of the case that determine whether or not an earlier statement
consistent with the evidence of the witness is itself admissible. '77 Dixon C.J.,
in The Nominal Defendant v. Clements, states that a cross-examination with
a view to showing certain improbabilities in the accused's story does not bring
the exception into play. There is not an implicit allegation that the story is
recently contrived in every case where the accused denies the truth of the
Crown's case. "The judge at the trial must determine for himself upon the
conduct of the trial before him whether a case for applying the rule of evi-
dence has arisen and, from the nature of the matter, if there be an appeal,
great weight should be given to his opinion by the appellate court. '78
Logically, the inference of guilt from a failure to speak before trial arises
in every criminal case, but since this inference abrogates the right of an
accused to remain silent, evidentiary prohibitions to this logical inference
have developed. Unfortunately, these evidentiary rules are ineffectual in pro-
tecting this right. First, the rule distinguishes between treating silence as
evidence of guilt and "a matter to be regarded with reference to the weight
of evidence." 79 While silence cannot imply guilt, it can be taken into consider-
ation in determining the weight to be assigned to the accused's testimony.
This, however, is a "distinction without a difference." 0 The jury probably is
unable to apply this distinction; furthermore, they need not even be told
about it. In R. v. Torbiak, on a charge of robbery, the accused testified that
he had been drunk and comatose in the car that was admittedly used for the
robbery. 81 The trial judge asked the accused whether he had given the same
story to the police at the time of his arrest, and the accused replied that he
had not. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the evidence was admissible,
and that it was not necessary for the trial judge to direct the jury as to its
limited use or that the accused had a right to remain silent. Kelly J.A. con-
cluded: "[I]t would have been more damaging to Campbell's cause to have
77 The Nominal Defendant v. Clements, supra note 5, at 494.
78 Id. at 479.
79 R. v. Littleboy, [1934] 2 K.B. 408 at 414. With regard to silence at trial, it is
open to the trier of fact to draw an inference as to guilt from the failure of the accused
to testify. See Vezeau v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 277, 66 D.L.R. (3d) 418. While
the accused is protected to some extent by the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
E-10, s. 4(5), which prohibits comment by the trial judge and Crown counsel in jury
trials on the failure to testify, the section does not prohibit the jury from drawing an
adverse inference. In contrast, judges in England may comment on the failure of the
accused to testify: Williams, The Proof of Guilt: A Study of the English Criminal Trial
(3d ed. London: Stevens and Sons, 1963) at 59-60.
80 Cross, An Attempt to Update the Law of Evidence, Hebrew University of Jeru-
salem, Lionel Cohen Lectures, Nineteenth Series (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1973) at 13.
81R. v. Torbiak (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 229 (Ont. C.A.).
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directed the jury's attention to that area and then qualified the use they could
make of the fact than to have avoided making any reference to the whole
incident. '82
Second, while the judge may not tell a jury that they may draw an in-
ference of guilt from pretrial silence, juries will, in any event, do so. This
common sense inference from pretrial silence was referred to in R. v. Sullivan.83
The accused, who was charged with smuggling watches, refused to answer
questions after his arrest. The trial judge told the jury that he had "an abso-
lute right to do just that, and it is not to be held against him that he did that.
But you might well think that if a man is innocent he would be anxious to
answer questions. '84 Salmon L.J., in referring to this direction, commented:
"It seems pretty plain that all the members of that jury, if they had any com-
mon sense at all, must have been saying to themselves precisely what the trialjudge said to them. The appellant was not obliged to answer, but how odd,
if he was innocent, that he should not have been anxious to tell the Customs
officer why he had been to Geneva, whether he put the watches in the bag
and so on."'8 5
Given these realities, it is unfair to the accused not to admit all pretrial
statements if the accused testifies. The current rule admits these statements,
when offered by the defence, only if they are part of the res gestae0 or come
within the exception for statements to rebut an allegation of recent fabrica-
tion.87 Defence counsel will not know before trial whether the statement will
be admitted. It is submitted that the evidence should be before the jury when
it is deciding what weight to assign to the testimony of the accused. The
dictum by Kerwin C.J.C. in Lucas v. The Queen to the effect that an accused
can testify that "he made a statement to the police, following his arrest, which
was similar to the evidence he had given at trial," 88 should be adopted as the
general rule. This is not a case of an accused placing his defence before thejury through out-of-court statements. The possibility that the statement was
concocted can be assessed by the jury, since the accused is available for cross-
examination on the statement by the Crown. The Ontario Report is deficient
in not considering the admission of consistent statements of the accused.
2. Implied Allegation of Fabrication
At common law the allegation of recent fabrication did not have to be
expressed. The nature of the evidence and the conduct of the trial could imply
that the witness did not speak at a time when it would have been natural to
82 Id. at 234.
83 (1966), 51 Cr. App. R. 102 (C.A.).
84 Id. at 105.
85 Id. This common sense approach was not adopted in R. v. Keeler, supra note 3,
at 418. The accused had given a statement to the police at the time of his arrest that
was consistent with his testimony that the victim had consented. McDermid J.A. states:
"I do not think any jury would assume, in the absence of any evidence, that an accused,
when arrested, had or had not given the story he was now giving in the witness box,"
8 6 R. v. Graham, supra note 54.
87 R. v. Racine, supra note 64; R. v. Giraldi, supra note 59.
88 [1963] 1 C.C.C. 1 at 10-11 (S.C.C.).
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speak and that the in-court testimony was an afterthought. In 1889 in R. v.
Coil, Holmes J. noted that "skilful counsel do not always deal in direct im-
putation. The same effect can be produced in an even more striking way by
delicate suggestion."' 9 An allegation may be inferred from cross-examination,
the nature of the case, and the conduct of the defence. Two situations in
which an allegation of failure to speak is always implied are when the accused
gives alibi evidence and when the accused is found in possession of material
relevant to a criminal charge.
Prior statements explaining possession of illegal items should be admis-
sible if the accused testifies. Wigmore cites some old authorities that admit
statements explaining the possession of stolen goods made both before sus-
picion arose and after the accused had been found in possession.9" The im-
plication is that the accused would have given an explanation if the possession
was innocent. Admissibility under the current rule, however, depends on the
circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court of Canada held, in R. v.
Graham, that statements made contemporaneously with being found in pos-
session are admissible as part of the res gestae even if the accused does not
testify.91 In R. v. Risby, the Supreme Court refused to limit Graham to state-
ments explaining the possession of stolen goods, and held that an explanation
of possession of an illegal drug was admissible.92 However, in all cases in
which possession is an element of the offence, there is- an implied allegation
that the accused did not speak when it was natural to do so, and explanations
of illegal possession are admissible if there has been an allegation of recent
fabrication. In R. v. Giraldi, the accused testified as to his previous consistent
statement, explaining his possession of stolen goods during his direct exami-
nation before he had been cross-examined by the Crown.93 The British Colum-
bia Court of Appeal found that a suggestion of recent fabrication arose
"having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the
trial," and admitted the testimony.9 4 The Court held that "a suggestion of
recent fabrication need not necessarily be made expressly but may arise im-
plicitly.. ." and concluded that: "The Crown would contend or the jury itself
might consider the respondent's testimony to have been concocted by him or
for him after he found himself under arrest."
95
The Ontario Draft Act does not provide that an implied allegation of
contrivance is sufficient. The drafting may be contrasted with the United
89 Supra note 73, at 542.
90 Wigmore, supra note 5, Vol. 6 (1976) at 304-08, 1781; R. v. Abraham (1848),
3 Cox C.C. 430; R. v. Crowhurst (1844), 1 Car. & K. 370, 174 E.R. 851.91 Supra note 54.
92 Decision of February 28, 1978, Bulletin of Proceedings taken in the Supreme
Court of Canada, March 3, 1978 at 3.
93 Supra note 59. Also see R. v. Racine, supra note 64. The Crown was permitted
during its examination-in-chief, before the witness was cross-examined, to ask the witness
whether he had named his co-conspirators on his arrest. Martin J.A. approved the
Giraldi decision in R. v. Campbell, supra note 5, at 19 (C.C.C.), 325 (C.R.). Cf. R. v.
Pappin (1970), 12 C.R.N.S. 287 (Ont. C.A.).
94 R. v. Giraldi, id. at 253.
95 Id.
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States Federal Evidence Rule 801 (a) (1) (B), which provides that an allega-
tion may be "express or implied." 90 There is no reason to narrow the common
law rule. Under the Ontario Draft Act, a party could always prevent the
introduction of these statements by avoiding an express allegation of fabrica-
tion. Admitting statements to rebut an implied allegation will not result in
the admission of all consistent statements. Implied allegations of recent
fabrication do not include cross-examination with a view to showing im-
probabilities in the witness's story. Martin J.A. in R. v. Campbell concludes:
"If a witness cannot be cross-examined with a view to showing that his story
is improbable, without bringing into play the exception arising from a sugges-
tion of recent fabrication, he cannot be cross-examined at all without making
the exception operative." 97 The Ontario Draft Act should be amended to
include "express or implied" allegations.
3. Impeachment with Inconsistent Statements
There has been some discussion in the cases whether merely impeaching
a witness with an inconsistent statement raises a suggestion of recent fabrica-
tion and permits the introduction of a consistent statement. In R. v. Neigel,
a majority of the Alberta Supreme Court declined to decide the issue, but
Stuart J. was of the opinion that, even if there was only a single prior incon-
sistent statement, "it would be difficult, even in the face of a disavowal of
such a charge by the impeaching counsel, to get rid of at least a veiled sugges-
tion of recent concoction." 98 A better view is that merely impeaching the
testimony of a witness in cross-examination, even if that impeachment is in
the form of showing that the witness made a prior statement inconsistent with
his in-court testimony, is not sufficient to imply an allegation of recent fabri-
cation and allow proof of consistent statements. Holmes J. in R. v. Coil
concluded: "There must be something either in the nature of the inconsistent
statement or the use made of it by the cross-examiner, to enable such evi-
dence to be given." 99
The California Evidence Code provides that a consistent statement is
admissible to support credibility after:
s. 791 (a) Evidence of a statement made by him that is inconsistent with any
part of his testimony at the hearing has been admitted for the purpose of attack-
ing his credibility, and the statement was made before the alleged inconsistent
statement; ...
The strongest argument against admitting consistent statements in this situa-
tion is that the consistency does not explain away the self-contradiction. If
there are two inconsistent statements, the fact that the witness also made a
consistent one does not answer the question-why was there an inconsis-
tency? This argument, however, rests on an assumption that the prior incon-
sistent statement was actually made. If there is some doubt about this, the
prior consistent statement strengthens that doubt. Thus, if the witness denies
96 Supra note 69.
9 7 Supra note 5, at 20 (C.C.C.), 327 (C.R.).
9 SSupra note 5, at 160 (D.L.R.), 482 (W.W.R.), 238 (C.C.C.).
99 Supra note 73, at 541.
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making the inconsistent statement, the fact that he made a prior consistent
statement strengthens that denial. If the witness admits making the incon-
sistent statement, the prior consistent statement is not relevant since it does
not explain the inconsistency. However, any requirement of a denial would
motivate a witness to deny or claim a faulty memory of inconsistent state-
ments. There would be little time saved, since it would only result in the
exclusion of consistent statements if the witness clearly admitted making the
statement. 100 A provision similar to the one in the California Evidence Code
avoids the loss of relevant evidence. Therefore, whenever there is some doubt
whether the prior inconsistent statement was made, a prior consistent state-
ment should be admissible.
4. Credibility: Conclusion
The Ontario Draft Act provision on statements admissible to rebut an
allegation of recent fabrication is inadequate. Consistent statements made
before an inconsistent statement offered to impeach credibility, and statements
to rebut a charge that the testimony is influenced by bias or improper motive,
should be admissible. It is submitted that, rather than the Ontario Draft Act,
the following provision of the California Evidence Code should be adopted:
791 PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT OF WITNESS
Evidence of a statement previously made by a witness that is consistent with his
testimony at the hearing is inadmissible to support his credibility unless it is
offered after:
(a) Evidence of a statement made by him that is inconsistent with any part
of his testimony at the hearing has been admitted for the purpose of
attacking his credibility, and the statement was made before the alleged
inconsistent statement; or
(b) An express or implied charge has been made that his testimony at the
hearing is recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper
motive, and the statement was made before the bias, motive for fabri-
cation, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.
5. Recent Fabrications: Substantive Evidence
At common law, statements admitted to rebut an allegation of recent
fabrication are not substantive evidence. The Ontario Draft Act admits these
statements "not only to support the credibility of the witness, but as substan-
tive evidence of the facts stated therein." The Report does not expressly state
the reasons for this change. It merely concludes:
[Wihere the evidence of a witness is challenged by the opposing party as a fabri-
cation for the purpose of the trial the fact that he made a prior consistent state-
ment may well support the credibilty of the witness. In addition the witness is
on the witness stand and available to testify to the facts contained in the statement.' 0'
The Report does not discuss why this reasoning does not justify the substan-
tive use of all the exceptions to the common law rule. As has been pointed
out, in each case the statement is relevant and the witness is available for
cross-examination. The critical factor is the reliability of the statement: Will
the trier of fact be able to assess correctly its truth? Statements to rebut an
100 See Thomas, Rehabilitating the Impeached Witness with Consistent Statements
(1967), 32 Mod. L. Rev. 472.
101 Ontario Report, supra note 21, at 54.
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
allegation of recent fabrication are not necessarily more reliable than the
statements admitted under the other common law exceptions.
Putting aside for a moment the question of whether all consistent state-
ments should be admitted as substantive evidence, no objection can be raised
to the Ontario Draft Act provision with regard to statements to rebut an
allegation of recent fabrication. The witness has already given the same in-
formation in the in-court testimony and is available for cross-examination on
the consistent statement. The opposite party opens the way to the reception
of the statement. In this case the statement is particularly relevant and there
is no need to perpetuate the subtle and ineffective distinction between evi-
dence going to credibility and substantive evidence. Both the United States
Federal Rules of Evidence102 and the California Evidence Code admit these
statements as substantive evidence.1 03
B. Complaints in Sexual Cases
1. Current Law
a) Fact of Complaint
The fact that the victim of a sexual offence made a complaint at the
first reasonable opportunity is admissible to support the credibility of the
victim.'0 4 Originally, the fact of the complaint was received on charges of
rape, to rebut the "strong, but not a conclusive, presumption against a woman,
that she made no complaint in a reasonable time after the fact."' 0 5 The old
law of hue and cry had required that "the woman should immediately after
... go to the next town and there make discovery to some credible person
of the injury she has suffered."'u0 It was assumed that if she "concealed the
injury for any considerable time after she had opportunity to complain,"
there was "a strong, but not conclusive, presumption that her testimony was
false or feigned."'01 7 A silence before trial was in contradiction to her testi-
mony at trial and implied either that the offence had not occurred or that
the complainant had consented. The complaint was admitted to rebut this
implication. There is an obligation on the Crown either to show that a com-
plaint was made or to explain its absence.' 08 The complaint is "a virtually
essential complement to her story."'109 An adverse inference as to the truth-
102 Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 801 (d)(1)(B), 28 U.S.C.A.
1o3 West's Ann. Evid. Code § 1236.
104 R. v. Lillyman, supra note 5, at 170 (Q.B.), 731 (L.T.R.); R. v. Osborne, [19051
1 K.B. 551; R. v. Hill, [1928] 61 O.L.R. 645, 2 D.L.R. 736, 49 C.C.C. 161 (C.A.); R. v.
Kribs, [1960] S.C.R. 400, 127 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.); Thomas v. The Queen, supra note 46.
105 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, bk. i. c. 41, s. 3, quoted by Hawkins, J. in R. v.
Lillyman, supra note 5, at 170 (Q.B.), 731 (L.T.R.).
06 IV Blackstone's Commentaries (4th ed. 1770), c. 15 at 211, quoted in R. v.
Lillyman, id. at 171 (Q.B.), 731 (L.T.R.).
10 7 IV Blackstone's Commentaries, id., c. 15 at 213, quoted in R. v. Lillyman, id. at
171 (Q.B.), 731 (L.T.R.).
108 R. v. Jones, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 515, 18 M.P.R. 164, 84 C.C.C. 299 (P.E.I. S.C.);
R. v. Kribs, supra note 104, at 27 per Fauteux J.
loKilby v. The Queen (1973), 129 C.L.R. 460; approved by Dubin J.A. in R. v.
Kistendey (1976), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 383 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Bruce (1975), 23 C.C.C.
(2d) 16 (Ont. C.A.).
[VOL. 17, NO. 2
Consistent Statements of a Witness
fulness of the victim can be drawn from the failure of a victim to complain
at the first reasonable opportunity and, in the absence of special circum-
stances, the trial judge must so direct the jury." 0 The absence of complaint
is not evidence of consent. Barwick C.J., in R. v. Kilby, concluded that "the
want of a complaint does not found an inference of consent. It does fall
against the consistency of the woman's account and accordingly is clearly
relevant to her credibility in that respect." '' There is some authority that the
victim's explanation of a failure to complain is admissible," r2 although Dubin
J.A. in R. v. Kistendey held that the victim need not be given an opportunity
to explain before the trial judge is required to give a direction as to the ad-
verse inference that may be drawn from failure to complain at the first rea-
sonable opportunity." 3 He also doubted that the explanation in that case was
admissible if it entailed a reference to a complaint that the judge had ruled
inadmissible because it had not been made at the first reasonable opportunity.
The complainant may testify as to the fact a complaint was made even if the
recipient of the complaint is not called.114
b) Details of Complaint
In England and Canada, the details of the complaint are admissible on
the direct examination of the victim. This was not clearly decided until 1898
in R. v. Lillyman, when Hawkins J. found that the question was still open,
although the practice had been to exclude the details. 15 He noted that the
complaint was admissible "as evidence of the consistency of the conduct of
the prosecutrix with the story told by her in the witness-box, and as being
inconsistent with her consent to that of which she complains.""16 Neverthe-
less, he wondered how the jury could make this determination if the details
of the complaint were not before it. It was "to ask the jury to draw important
inferences from imperfect materials, perfect materials being at hand. .... ,17
Therefore, the particulars of the complaint had to be admissible, not as
evidence of the facts complained of, but to show that the complaint was
consistent with her testimony and in "accordance with the conduct they would
expect in a truthful woman under the circumstances detailed by her.""18
The complaint and the particulars are admissible even if the consent of
the victim is not in issue, since the purpose of receiving the statement is to
show the consistency of the words and behaviour of the victim. 19 The com-
plainant should testify as to the circumstances before third parties give evi-
110 Kilby v. The Queen, id. at 472.
111 Id.
12 R. v. Rearden (1864), 4 F. & F. 76, 176 E.R. 473; R. v. Mace (1975), 25 C.C.C.
(2d) 121 (Ont. C.A.).
113 Supra note 109.
114R. v. Kribs, supra note 104. Also see Cross, Complaints of Sexual Offences
(1958), 74 L.Q. Rev. 352.
115 Supra note 5. See Greenfield, The Prompt Complaint (1967), 9 Crim. L.Q. 286.
"
6iR. v. Lillyman, id. at 170 (Q.B.), 731 (L.T.R.).
117 Id. at 178 (Q.B.), 733 (L.T.R.).
i18 d. at 177 (Q.B.), 733 (L.T.R.).
119 R. v. Osborne, supra note 104.
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dence of the complaint. Hawkins J. in Lillyman, in referring to complaints,
stated "strictly speaking, evidence of them ought to be given before evidence
of the complaint is admitted.' 120 The trial judge must direct the jury that
they are "not entitled to make use of the complaint as any evidence whatever
of those facts, or for any other purpose" except for "enabling the jury tojudge for themselves whether the conduct of the woman was consistent with
her testimony .... "121
The complaint cannot satisfy any rule that requires corroboration of the
victim's testimony,122 although there is no obligation on the trial judge to
instruct the jury that a complaint cannot corroborate the victim's evidence
once he has told them that it can only be regarded as going to the victim's credi-
bility.123 At common law, there was a rule of practice requiring corroborating
evidence in cases of rape. While the jury could convict on the uncorroborated
evidence of the prosecutrix, the judge had to warn them that it is dangerous
to do so and could in his discretion advise them not to do so.' 2 4 This rule was
codified in 1955 in what was then section 134 of the Criminal Code.125 In
1976, 126 this section (then section 142) was repealed. The effect of the repeal
has been debated. R. v. Firkins, 27 R. v. Daigle128 and R. v. Camp12 ) have
held that the old common law rule has not been revived, although Dubin J.A.
in R. v. Camp held that in the circumstances of that case it was permissible
for the trial judge to tell the jury that "where consent is the serious issue it
is often easy for the woman to say that she did not consent, that is that she
was raped in circumstances in which it would be very difficult for the man
to defend himself."'l 0 Thus, while it is not a rule of law that the trial judge
must warn the jury of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evi-
dence of the victim or that he must define what evidence is capable of cor-
roboration, the new rule of R. v. Camp places a duty on the trial judge "in
appropriate cases, while commenting on the weight to be given to the evidence
of a complainant to caution the jury in simple language as to the risk of
relying solely on the evidence of a single witness, and to explain to them the
reasons for the necessity of such caution."' 3 ' These cases do not decide
120 R. v. Lillyman, supra note 5, at 170 (Q.B.), 731 (L.T.R.).
121 Id. at 177-78 (Q.B.), 733 (L.T.R.).
122 Thomas v. The Queen, supra note 46.
123 R. v. Cosgrove (1976), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 169 (Ont. C.A.); cf. R. v. Cross, [1970]
1 O.R. 693, [1970] 1 C.C.C. 216 (C.A.).
124 Thomas v. The Queen, supra note 46, at 353 (S.C.R.), 311 (D.L.R.), 199
(C.C.C.).
125 Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 134; the section refers only to rape,
attempt to commit rape, sexual intercourse with a female person under 14 and with
a female person who is between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. R. v. Cullen, [1975]
6 W.W.R. 153, 26 C.C.C. (2d) 79 (B.C.C.A.), held that a corroboration warning is
required for other sexual offences under the Code such as gross indecency or buggery.
126 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1975, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 8.
127 (1977), 80 D.L.R. (3d) 63, 39 C.R.N.S. 178 (B.C.C.A.).
128 (1977), 26 A.P.R. 658, 37 C.C.C. (2d) 386 (N.B.C.A.).
129 (1977), 17 O-R_ (2d) 99, 39 C.R.N.S. 164 (C.A.).
1l Id. at 110 (O.R.), 176 (C.R.N.S.).
131 Id. at 109 (O.R.), 175 (C.R.N.S.).
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whether it is still open to a trial judge to explain the desirability of finding
independent evidence that connects the accused with the crime,13 2 and then
to point out that a complaint is not independent evidence. It will still be
necessary for the trial judge to direct the jury that the complaint is only
admitted to support the credibility of the victim.
c) Developments
The original rule was confined to complaints of victims of rape, but it
has been expanded subsequently to admit complaints of boys and men,' 33 and
complaints in offences of nonsexual violence. 34 There is no logical distinction
among these offences, since the evidence is only admissible to show the con-
sistency between the conduct of the complainant and the in-court testimony.
In R. v. McNamara,x13 in a charge of attempt to commit an unnatural offence,
the Court of Appeal of New Zealand admitted the complaint of a young
boy. Chapman J. concluded: "I do not see why we should not follow a
logical course of reasoning in connecting two cases which are really of one
class .... "1 36 The Court reasoned that consistency was as important in sexual
assaults on males as on females.
Chapman J. was also of the view that the rule should be extended to
assaults other than sexual assaults since "[tihere is the same reason for ad-
mitting evidence to show consistency of conduct in one case as in the
other.' 37 A recent decision in the British Columbia County Court, R. v.
Frame,"3 admitted evidence of the fact and the details of a complaint on a
charge of forcible confinement of a sixteen-year-old girl. MacDonald Co. Ct.
J. reasoned that "if the nature of the offence is one where the complainant
might be expected to complain immediately or soon after it was committed,
then surely it would be of assistance to any judge or jury to know whether
or not such complaint was made, and when it was made.""1 9 In essence, he is
asking whether there is an implied self-contradiction in the case at hand.
Would it be a natural assumption that the victim would make a complaint
and, in the absence of such proof, would an adverse inference be drawn as
to the credibility of the victim?
2. Analysis of the Rule
At common law, consistent statements of a witness are excluded because,
in the absence of special circumstances, they are considered to be legally
irrelevant, i.e., the fact that the witness has said the same thing earlier is of
132 See R. v. Baskerville, [1916] 2 K.B. 658 at 667, for a definition of independent
evidence of corroboration.
'33 R. v. Camelleri (1922), 16 Cr. App. R. 162; R. v. Lebrun, [1951] O.R. 387,
100 C.C.C. 16, 12 C.R. 31 (C.A.).
1 4 R. v. Hurst (1966), 55 W.W.R. 358, [1966] 3 C.C.C. 399, 48 C.R. 238
(B.C.C.A.).
'35 [1917] N.Z.L.R. 382 (C.A.).
136 Id. at 402.
137 Id.
138 [1976] 6 W.W.R. 193, 31 C.C.C. (2d) 332 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
139Id. at 194 (W.W.R.), 334 (C.C.C.).
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
little help in assessing his credibility. Complaints in sexual cases are con-
sidered to be more relevant than other consistent statements because it is
assumed that the victim of a sexual offence is more likely than the ordinary
witness to bring false accusations. The basis for this assumption was ex-
pressed by Hale in 1675: "[I]t is an accusation easily to be made and hard
to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so
innocent.' 40 There is a belief that it is a charge easily fabricated and that
juries will sympathize with the complainant. In 1962, Glanville Williams
concluded that "sexual cases are particularly subject to the danger of deliber-
ately false charges, resulting from sexual neurosis, phantasy, jealousy, spite
or simply a girl's refusal to admit that she consented to an act of which she is
now ashamed.' 41 Thus, an a priori rule developed at common law based on
the nature of the offence and not on the credibility of the particular victim
in each case.'142 The real issue, as was recognized in R. v. Frame,1 '3 is whether
the victim in this particular case spoke at a time when it was natural to do so.
If the assumption that victims of sexual offences are likely to lie is not correct,
then there is no more reason for admitting complaints than for admitting
other consistent statements. The logical approach would be to treat sexual
complaints in the same manner as other consistent statements and admit them
only if they come within recognized exceptions, such as statements to rebut
an allegation of recent fabrication or spontaneous declarations.
The courts traditionally have viewed the testimony of certain kinds of
witnesses with caution. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in R. v. Hester gave the
following reasons for this caution:
The accumulated experience of courts of law, reflecting accepted general knowl-
edge of the ways of the world, has shown that there are many circumstances and
situations in which it is unwise to found settled conclusions on the testimony of
one person alone. The reasons for this are diverse. There are some suggestions
which can readily be made but which are only with more difficulty rebutted.
There may in some cases be motives of self-interest, or of self-exculpation, or
vindictiveness. In some situations the straight line of truth is diverted by the
influences of emotion or of hysteria or of alarm or of remorse. Sometimes it may
be that owing to immaturity or perhaps to lively imaginative gifts there is no
true appreciation of the gulf that separates truth from falsehood. It must, there-
fore, be sound policy to have rules of law or of practice which are designed to
avert the peril that findings of guilt may be insecurely based. 144
Thus, the testimony of child witnesses, accomplices, and victims of sexual
offences is suspect. Rules, either of practice or of law, requiring corroboration
of their testimony have been developed. This section of the paper is limited
to rules governing the testimony of adult victims of sexual offences. The
testimony of child victims of sexual offences should be regulated by the rules
that govern child testimony generally.
140 1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown (lst ed., 1736) at 635.
141 Williams, Corroboration-Sexual Cases, [1962] Crim. L.R. 662 at 662.
14 2 See Friedman, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform
(1972), 81 Yale L.J. 1365.
143 Supra note 138.
144 [1973] A.C. 296 at 309 (H.L.).
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Is this suspicion justified? Is there empirical evidence that indicates that
victims of sexual offences are no more likely to bring false charges than vic-
tims of other offences? There have been several studies of rape and other
sexual offences. 14 ", One Canadian study done by Clark and Lewis examined
116 rape complaints in Toronto in 1971 .146 Several studies have also been
made in the United States, the most prominent one being Patterns in Forcible
Rape by Amir, who studied 646 reported rapes in Philadelphia during 1958
and 1960.147 Kalven and Zeisel in 1966 studied jury behaviour in rape trials
in the United States.148
These studies support the proposition that the credibility of rape com-
plainants is no more suspect than that of other witnesses. First, the number
of unreported rapes indicates that it is not a charge that is readily made.
Clark and Lewis, in their study of rape in Toronto, state that in Canada the
best guess among experts is that "for every ten rapes committed, between
1 and 4 are reported."'149 Similar estimates have been made in the United
States. For example, one survey in the United States estimated that one in
four rapes is actually reported.150 One author submits the following reasons
for this reluctance:
The reasons for this failure to report the crime are varied: Parents may want to
protect a child from publicity, ordeal, or emotional injury; the victim may fear
being accused of provoking the rape; the victim may fear retaliation by the
offender; the victim may desire to protect her reputation and experience a sense
of shame from being raped; and, probably most common, a victim fears the
treatment she believes she will receive from the police and the courts often make
the victim feel or actually believe she is the offender and is the one on trial.
From the victim's point of view the decision to make an accusation of rape is
not an easy one. It is a decision that few are willing to make.' 5 '
145 Chappell et al., "Forcible Rape: A Comparative Study of Offenses Known to
the Police in Boston and Los Angeles," in Henslin, ed., Studies in the Sociology of Sex
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971) at 169-90; Amir, Patterns in Forcible
Rape (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971); Ringrose, Sociological, Medical
and Legal Aspects of Rape (1975), 17 Crim. L.Q. 440; Galton, Police Processing of
Rape Complaints: A Case Study (1975-76), 4 Am. J. Crim. Law 15; Comment, Police
Discretion and the Judgment that a Crime has been Committed-Rape in Philadelphia
(1968), 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 277; Brownmiller, Against Our Will (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1975); Medea and Thompson, Against Rape (New York: Farrar, Straus &
Giroux, 1974); Astor, The Charge is Rape (Chicago: Playboy Press, 1974).
140 Clark and Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality (Toronto: The Women's
Press, 1977).
147 Supra note 145.
148 Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966). Also
see Jones and Aronson, Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Res-
pectability of the Victim (1973), 26(3) J. of Personality and Soc. Psych. 415; Feldman-
Summers and Lindner, Perceptions of Victims and Defendants in Criminal Assault
Cases (1976), 3(2) Crim. Just. and Behavior 135; Fulero and Delara, Rape Victims
and Attributed Responsibility: A Defensive Attribution Approach (1976), 1 Victimology
551.
141 Supra note 146, at 61.
150 United States President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, The Challenge of Crime iz a Free Society (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967) at 21.
151 Danow, Jury Instruction in a Rape Trial: Recent Revisions and the Argument
for Further Reform (1976), 1 Crim. Just. J. 113 at 115.
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In addition to indicating that victims are reluctant to bring charges, these
figures also imply that a victim may be reluctant to discuss the incident with
a stranger or even with friends. There may be little basis for the assumption
that a "truthful woman"'152 would immediately raise a "hue and cry."
Second, reported rapes are scrutinized by the police. A complaint of rape
must be classified as "founded" before it can proceed through the justice
system, and a high percentage of complaints are classified as "unfounded."' 3
In December, 1977, in British Columbia, 27 percent of sexual offence com-
plaints and 56 per cent of rape complaints were classified as "unfounded."' 15 4
In the Clark and Lewis study, 63.8 percent of reported rapes were classified
as "unfounded."' 155 Examination of the "unfounded" complaints and of the
decision-making processes of police officers indicates that a classification of
"unfounded" does not necessarily mean that a rape did not occur. Rather, it
was suggested by Clark and Lewis that a classification of "unfounded" is made
in the following circumstances: (1) the victim is unsuitable as a witness,
(2) there is no corroborative evidence, (3) the complaint has been with-
drawn, (4) the finding is unexplained in that there is independent evidence
of rape, and (5) the charge is false. 56 Clark and Lewis considered that of
116 reported rapes, of which the police classified seventy-four as unfounded,
only twelve were fabrications. 157 Third, a classification of "founded" does not
necessarily imply that a charge will be laid. Only a small percentage of rapes
that are classified as "founded" result in charges being brought. In British
Columbia in 1977, only 35 percent of "founded" complaints of rape resulted
in charges being filed. 158 In the Clark and Lewis study, 59.5 percent of the
"founded" complaints of rape resulted in charges being brought.'50
Studies of attitudes of police officers have shown that there is a general
belief that complaints of rape are false. A study by Galton concluded that
police tend to hold the rape victim to a higher standard of conduct than other
victims, and expect her story upon repeated tellings to be errorless.' 6° Police,
in evaluating a complaint, place great weight on evidence of physical violence,
although this is not a necessary element of the offence. In the Clark and
152R. v. Lillyman, supra note 5, at 177 (Q.B.), 733 (L.T.R.). Hawkins J. states
that the jury is to consider whether the conduct of the victim at the time of the offence
was "in accordance with the conduct they would expect in a truthful woman under the
circumstances detailed by her."
153 Victoria, Australia Law Reform Commissioner, Working Paper No. 4: Rape
Prosecutions (Court Procedures and Rules of Evidence) (Melbourne, 1976), Appendix
C at 40. A survey conducted by the Law Reform Commission found that 50 percent of
reported rape complaints in four selected Victorian districts were classified as "not
founded." In the United States, it is estimated that "about one-fifth of the rape complaints
received by the police are 'unfounded' after they were made." LeGrand, Rape and Rape
Laws: Sexism in Society and Law (1973), 61 Cal. L. Rev. 919 at 928.
154 British Columbia Criminal Justice Monthly Report, Dec. 1977 (Unpublished).
The percentage of unfounded complaints for offences against the person was 10 percent.
155 Clark and Lewis, supra note 146, at 34.
156 Id. at 35-38; also see LeGrand, supra note 153.
157 id. at 38.
158 B.C. Criminal Justice Monthly Report, supra note 154.
159 Clark and Lewis, supra note 146, at 55.
160 Galton, supra note 145, at 20.
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Lewis study, physical violence was present in 62.5 percent of the "founded"
cases as compared with 38 percent of the "unfounded" cases. 161 The Galton
study on the attitude of police investigators found that "investigators expect
a complainant to resist in virtually all cases in which no weapon is exhibited.'
u 2
These investigators expected resistance to be shown by screaming, an hysterical
state upon reporting the rape, and some physical injury. Thus, the fourth point
is that complaints that result in charges being laid are usually supported by
evidence of violence, presence of a weapon, threats, and resistance by the
victim. Of those eventually charged with rape in 1973 in Canada, however,
only 39 percent were convicted. In contrast, 66.7 percent of those charged
with an offence against the person were convicted. 16 The general conviction
rate in 1973 for all indictable offences was 76 percent.
0 4
Fifth, in addition to this filtering out of false charges, studies on juries
show that the accused does not suffer special prejudice on a charge of rape.
Kalven and Zeisel, in their study on the American jury, found that "the jury
chooses to redefine the crime of rape in terms of its notions of assumption of
risk,"'Gr and "is moved to be lenient with the defendant whenever there are
suggestions of contributory behavior on [the victim's] part."' 66 The jury "re-
writes" the law of rape to favour the defendant especially in cases of "simple"
rape, which was defined by Kalven and Zeisel as including all cases in which
none of the following circumstances is present: "evidence of extrinsic violence
or in which there are several assailants involved, or in which the defendant
and the victim are complete strangers at the time of the event.' 67 Yet in the
case of simple rape, the common law requires the jury to be warned as to the
danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of the victim.
One argument to support the continued special treatment of the testimony
of victims of sexual offences is that, since the issue is usually one of consent,
the credibility of the victim is more important than in cases in which there
is independent evidence of a crime. While there is a fear that the trial will be
a credibility contest between the victim and the accused, there is some evidence
that this is not the case. In the United States, studies have shown that it is not
more likely to be the word of the victim against that of the accused in sexual
assault cases than in nonsexual assault, and less likely than in some other
offences. Kalven and Zeisel found that eyewitness evidence was presented by
the defence in rape prosecutions more frequently than in burglary, narcotics
or drunk driving prosecutions. The defendant was less likely to testify in rape
prosecution than in assault prosecutions.168
Continuing to segregate complaints into a special class supports the
101 Clark and Lewis, supra note 146, at 68.
162 Galton, supra note 145, at 24.
103 Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences for the period January 1, 1973 to
December 31, 1973 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1978) at 203.
164 Id. at 14.
165 Kalven and Zeisel, supra note 148, at 254.
166 Id. at 249.
167 Id. at 252.
168 Id. at 143, Table 41.
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assumption that the credibility of all victims of sexual offences is suspect,
when in reality this depends on the circumstances of each case. Generalizing
from the nature of the offence tends to obscure the uniqueness of each case.
It places an onus on each victim of a sexual offence to establish his or her
credibility. The danger of generalization is illustrated by the common law rule
of practice, according to which the trial judge had to warn the jury that it is
dangerous to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the victim of a sexual
offence, and he could, in his discretion, advise them not to do so.'0 9 It is
assumed that the victim of every sexual offence is likely to bring false accusa-
tions even when the only issue is identification. Logically, if the victim has
not had any previous contact with the accused, there is less danger of bias
or a motive to deceive. The real issue in this case is the accuracy of the identifi-
cation. Still, the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Trigg held that a general
warning that it is dangerous to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the
complainant must be given even if the only issue is the identity of the accused,
although in this case the jury should be told that the principal source of error
is the inherent frailty of the identification evidence and not the credibility
of the victim.170 The circumstances vary from case to case. Certainly, more
research must be done into the effect on credibility of a relationship between
the victim and the defendant, 17' but it is common sense that there is not the
same possibility of a motive to deceive in the case of a rape by a stranger. The
police assume that previous contact indicates that the complaint is unfounded.
In the Clark and Lewis study, only 20 percent of reported rapes where the
victim knew the accused previously were classified as "founded. 172
While empirical studies are subject to error, there has been sufficient
replication in this case to suggest that there is a valid basis for stating that
the credibility of rape victims should not be singled out as being generally
suspect. The problem of the credibility of the victim is the same as in every
offence without physical evidence of the crime, such as fraud or conspiracy.
The jury should be alerted that the "existence or non-existence of a bias,
interest or other motive"' 73 will have a bearing on the credibility of the witness.
The jury can also be told of the effect of conflicting testimony and that, before
they find any fact solely on the basis of a single witness, they "should carefully
review all of the testimony upon which proof of such fact depends."'174 The
trial judge will also relate the facts to the legal issues and point out the essence
of the case for the Crown and defence. A general warning such as "it is often
easy for the woman to say that she did not consent, that is that she was raped
in circumstances in which it would be very difficult for the man to defend
169 Thomas v. The Queen, supra note 46.
170 [19631 1 All E.R. 490.
171 Clark and Lewis, supra note 146, at 72, suggest that finer distinctions should
be drawn in defining the "relationship" between the victim and defendant. They argue
that there is no relationship if there has been no prior contact and the victim meets the
defendant at a bar, party or while hitchhiking. They point out that it is particularly
difficult to infer a "relationship" if the defendant gives the victim false information in
order to gain her trust.
172 Clark and Lewis, id. at 71.
173 People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P. 2d 247 at 261 (Cal. S.C. 1975).
174 Id.
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himself," 17r, or that an adverse inference can be drawn from a failure to com-
plain, should not be given in any case.
3. Reform
Proposals for reform of the law governing sexual offences have recom-
mended abolishing the exception for complaints. The South Australian Law
Reform Commission recommended that "unless a complaint be otherwise
admissible in evidence on the hearing of a charge of a sexual nature, evidence
of that complaint be made inadmissible by statute."' 7 6 This proposal has also
been recommended in New South Wales.177 In Canada, the repeal by Parlia-
ment of the statutory requirement that the trial judge direct the jury that it
is not safe to convict on the basis of the uncorroborated evidence of the female
victim' 78 recognizes that there is no basis for an a priori rule based on the
nature of the offence.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission, however, does not discuss the
admissibility of complaints in sexual offences. In the absence of any change,
the common law would prevail under the Ontario Draft Act. A complaint of
a witness would be admissible under the Canada Evidence Code, since all prior
statements of a witness with first hand knowledge are admissible. It is submitted
that the common law rule on complaints should be abolished. If an exclusionary
rule is retained, as is recommended by the Ontario Draft Act, a complaint
would be admissible if it satisfies the criteria of an exception such as a statement
to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication or a spontaneous exclamation,
even though it was made some time after the attack or in response to a leading
question.
Under the common law rule, a complaint must have been made at the first
reasonable opportunity, 79 and it must not have been elicited by questions of a
"leading, inducing or intimidating character."180 It is a question of law whether
175 R. v. Camp, supra note 129, at 110 (O.R.), 176 (C.R.N.S.).
176 Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia,
Special Report: Rape and Other Sexual Offences (March 1976) at 48.
177 See O'Connor, Rape Law Reform-The Australian Experience-Part 1, [1977]
1 Crim. L.J. 305 at 313.
178 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 142 (repealed by the Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1975, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 8).
170 In R. v. Elliott (1928), 62 O.L.R. 1 at 6, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 244 at 250, 49 C.C.C.
302 at 308 (C.A.), on a charge of committing sodomy with a boy under thirteen years
of age, the complaint by the boy made one month after the alleged offence was not
admissible. Per Hodgins J.A.: the complaint was "open to all the objections that have
from time to time been stated against admitting a complaint where opportunity and time
have been given to devise and set forth an untrue accusation." R. v. Hill, supra note 104;
leave to appeal refused, [1928] S.C.R. 156. The first reasonable opportunity is not neces-
sarily the first opportunity. In the circumstances, it would not have been reasonable for
the victim to complain to anyone before she told her husband many hours after the
alleged offence. Also see R. v. Lebrun, supra note 133; R. v. Woodworth (1974), 17
C.C.C. (2d) 509 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Waddell (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 315 (B.C.C.A.);
and R. v. Jones, supra note 108.
180R. v. Lebrun, id. at 395 (O.R.), 26 (C.C.C.), 37 (C.R.) per Bowlby J.A. [Em-
phasis deleted.]. In R. v. Hunt, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 210 (Ont. H.C.), a statement made as
a result of police questioning was rejected.
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these criteria have been satisfied,' 8' but these two factors should also be
matters for the jury to consider in assigning weight to the complaint and should
not be a bar to admission. Both the complainant and the recipient are available
for cross-examination.
Elimination of the exception for complaints would also result in the
abolition of the rule that, if there is no recent complaint, a trial judge must,
in the absence of special circumstances, direct the jury that an adverse inference
can be drawn from that silence.'8 2 The victim's explanation of the absence
of the complaint would be admissible in every case.1ss Although, in R. v.
Kistendey, Dubin J.A. doubted whether the explanation was admissible if it
entailed bringing in a complaint that the trial judge had ruled was not recent,'84
the complaint and the explanation should be before the jury. It should be for
the jury to decide whether the complaint is probative on the issue of credibility.
Information of both the complaint and the explanation is necessary before
the jury can decide what inference can be drawn from delay in making a
complaint.
C. Identification Evidence
1. Introduction
Eyewitness identification evidence presents special problems. Its unre-
liability,185 in combination with the fact that it is often treated as conclusive, 80
has resulted in many miscarriages of justice.' 87 Despite the apparently convinc-
ing nature of this evidence, expert studies have shown that it is inherently more
181 R. v. Belliveau (1978), 25 N.S.R. (2d) 698 at 708. See R. v. Hill, supra note
104, at 738 (D.L.R.), 648 (O.L.R.), 163 (C.C.C.): "It was the province of the trial
Judge to decide whether the statement was made under circumstances which rendered
it properly admissible."
'
82 R. v. Kistendey; Kilby v. The Queen, supra note 109.
183 R. v. Rearden, supra note 112.
184 Supra note 109.
185 See, for example, Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification (1977), 29 Stan. L. Rev.
969; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony (1974), 231(6) Scientific American 23-31; Report
to the Secretary of State for the Home Department 'of the Departmental Committee on
Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (London: H.M.S.O., 1976) [hereinafter
Devlin Report]; Levine and Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap
from Wade to Kirby (1973), 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079; Trankell, Reliability of Evidence:
Methods for Analyzing and Assessing Witness Statements (Stockholm: Beckmans, 1972);
Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas,
1965); and Buckhout and Ellison, The Line-up: A Critical Look, [June, 1977] Psychology
Today 82. The term "line-up" will be used to designate a procedure of identification
whereby the suspect is placed in a line composed of a number of other persons of
similar height, age and general appearance. The eyewitness is then asked whether he
recognizes the perpetrator among those in the line. In England this procedure is referred
to as an "identification parade." The term "show-up" denotes a confirmation between
the eye-witness and the suspect. Also see note 188, infra.186 See note 204 and accompanying text, infra.
187 The Devlin Report, supra note 185, Appendix K, at 189, lists relevant cases
that have arisen over the last one hundred years. Also see Williams, The Proof of
Guilt: A Study of the English Criminal Trial, supra note 79; Borchard, Convicting the
Innocent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932); and Frankfurter, The Case of
Sacco and Vanzetti (Boston: Little, Brown, 1927).
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unreliable than other testimonial evidence.' 88 Experimental psychologists have
demonstrated that, even if the witness is honestly attempting to describe an
event accurately, errors may be caused by the processes of perception and
memory. The brain does not operate as a mechanical recording device-a
witness in describing an event does not merely reproduce his original perception
of the event. Perception is a constructive process. Only a few stimuli can be
remembered and individuals differ as to the stimuli that are selected. In addi-
tion, an event stored in memory will change over time. New information may
alter the memory, parts may be forgotten and details may be added. Despite
these dangers, the trier of fact must assess the reliability of the testimony.
To counter these dangers, the common law requires that the declarant testify.
Information is then provided from the demeanour and cross-examination of the
declarant-witness. It is assumed that this information is sufficient, and that it is
possible to reach a correct decision on the basis of this information.
Eyewitness identification evidence is more unreliable than other testi-
monial evidence. "Unreliable evidence" denotes evidence that will not be
evaluated correctly by the trier of fact. Four causes of this unreliability that
will be discussed are: first, identification evidence is subject to incremental
errors in perception and memory; second, identification evidence is particularly
susceptible to bias; third, the trier of fact may possess some misconceptions
about identification evidence; and fourth, the trier of fact may assume that it is
conclusive evidence of guilt.
First, empirical studies have shown that eyewitness identification evidence
is subject to additional errors in perception and memory. People generally have
difficulty in recognizing faces. Experiments in which the possibility of bias has
been minimized have shown that few witnesses make accurate identifications.
In one experiment, only 14 percent of the subjects were able to identify the
perpetrator correctly.'"9 Witnesses also make a great number of errors in their
descriptions, often relying on the height, weight and age of the population or
of themselves.' 90 The study of the process of recognition of a human face is
relatively undeveloped. Some work has been done on which particular features
of a human face convey the most information for recognition. It has been found,
for example, that the eyes themselves convey relatively little information and
that the upper portions of the face are more helpful in identification than the
lower portions.' 91 It has also been suggested that certain people may be recog-
18B For an examination of psychological studies of person identification and a
comprehensive bibliography, see Clifford and Bull, The Psychology of Person Identifica-
tion (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). There are numerous psychological
studies illustrating the sources of unreliability in person identification. A useful frame-
work that differentiates between variables about which the legal system can do something
and those about which it cannot is presented in Clifford and Scott, Individual and Situa-
tional Factors in Eyewitness Testimony (1978), 63 J. of Applied Psych. 352.
189 Buckhout et al., Determinants of eyewitness performance on a line-up (1974),
4(3) Bull. of the Psychonomic Soe'y 191.
190 Buckhout, Figueroa and Hoff, Eyewitness identification: Effects of suggestion
and bias in identification from photographs (1975), 6(1) Bull. of the Psychonomic
Soe'y 71.
191 Goldstein and Mackenberg, Recognition of human faces from isolated facial
features: A developmental study (1966), 6(4) Psychonomic Science 149.
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nized from one or more unique features, while other faces possess features
that are consistently confused with ones that they resemble. 92 It has been
shown that stress reduces perceptual ability and may direct attention from
facial features. 93 A victim may fixate on certain objects such as the hands or a
knife and remember little of facial features. Good viewing conditions and
length of viewing time greatly improve accuracy, but observations often occur
in poor viewing conditions and are of a brief duration. 194 These circumstances
are not as important in the evaluation of other testimonial evidence as, for
example, the time and location of a theft. It has also been shown that when
a number of witnesses compare descriptions, more errors are made than in
the case of an individual witness. 195
Second, there is a real possibility of bias in the identification process
itself, a bias that may not be recognized by the trier of fact. The witness has
a civic-minded desire to bring a criminal to justice.'" He will be motivated to
identify someone in a line-up if he knows that a suspect is in custody. There
will be a tendency to pick someone who conforms to the original description,
rather than the actual offender.197 Studies have shown the possibility of bias in
the way in which photographs are shown to a victim.198 Subtle signals from a
police officer, such as a photograph at an angle that implies that it has been
recently added, can influence the choice. The line-up itself may be a source of
error and must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether the accused
possesses any distinctive characteristics. 199 If a witness has seen a photograph,
he may simply attempt to choose the line-up participant who most closely
resembles the picture.200
Third, the layman has several misconceptions about eyewitness identifica-
tion that may lead to an error in evaluation. Although stress adversely affects
perceptual ability, a jury may believe that the presence of violence, for example,
indicates that every detail made a deep impression in the mind of the victim.20 1
Studies have also shown that, contrary to popular belief, a witness with a high
degree of confidence 20 2 is less likely to be correct. As has been mentioned,
192 Fisher and Cox, Recognizing human faces (1975), 6(2) Applied Ergonomics 104.
193 Katz and Reid, Expert Testimony on the Fallibility of Eyewitness Identification
(1977), 1 Crim. Just. J. 177 at 185; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 185;
Buckhout and Ellison, The Line-up: A Critical Look, supra note 185.
194Levine and Tapp, supra note 185; Loftus, Acquisition of information from
rapidly presented verbal and nonverbal stimuli (1974), 2(3) Memory and Cognition 545.
195 Katz and Reid, supra note 193, at 200. Also see Alper et al., Eyewitness identi-
fication: Accuracy of individual vs. composite recollection of a crime (1976), 8(2) Bull.
of the Psychonomic Soc'y 147.
190 Katz and Reid, id. at 189.
197 Doob and Kirschenbaum, Bias in Police Lineups-Partial Remembering (1973),
1 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 287 at 289-90.
198 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
199 Supra note 197, at 289.
200 Williams and Hammelmann, Identification Parades-Part 1, [1963] Crim. L.
Rev. 479 at 484.
201 Katz and Reid, supra note 193, at 198.
202 Buckhout et al., supra note 189; Katz and Reid, id. at 198.
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although it could be assumed that a number of identifications are more reliable
than one identification, discussion between witnesses will compound errors.20 3
Fourth, juries treat identification evidence as conclusive. One experiment
simulated a jury trial, using 150 students as jurors.20 4 Each juror received a
description of a grocery store robbery and murder and a summary of the evi-
dence and arguments presented at trial. One-third of the jurors were told that
there had been no identification evidence, one-third that a clerk had identified
the accused but that the defence claimed he was mistaken, and one-third that
the clerk had identified the accused but that the defence had discredited his
testimony by showing he had not been wearing his glasses at the time and had
uncorrected vision poorer than 20/400. Of the jurors in the "no witness" group,
18 percent voted for conviction compared with 72 percent of the jurors in the
second group, who heard of the eyewitness testimony. In the third group,
which was told of the completely discredited eyewitness testimony, 68 percent
convicted the accused.
In addition to this inherent unreliability, in-court cross-examination pro-
vides little information with which to assess the accuracy of the identification. 20 5
Witnesses, in recounting an event, do make errors in details, but normally a
court does not have to determine all of the details in order to decide the point
at issue. The test is whether the story is probable and coherent. In contrast, it
is possible that an identification may be the only evidence connecting the
defendant with the event. In this situation, there is no story and the verdict
must rest on a single observation that is difficult to evaluate. The demeanour
of the witness is useless, since a witness will often be honestly mistaken and
absolutely sincere in asserting the truth of an identification. Witnesses differ
widely in their ability to recognize faces, but there is no information on the
ability of this particular witness to recognize faces. In R. v. Sutton, Jessup J.A.
notes that the frailty of identification evidence is not merely a matter of the
inability of the witness, but arises "from the psychological fact of the un-
reliability of human observation and recollection. '206
Miscarriages of justice caused by mistaken identification have been docu-
mented.207 Two recent convictions in England based on a mistaken identifica-
tion resulted in the appointment by the Home Secretary of a committee chaired
by Lord Devlin to consider the question of identification evidence. The Report
on Evidence in Criminal Cases, issued in April, 1976, recommends several
changes in pre-trial and trial procedure concerning identification evidence. 208
The Devlin Report concluded: "We are satisfied that in cases which depend
wholly or mainly on eye-witness evidence of identification there is a special
203 Supra note 191 and accompanying text.
204 Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, [December 1974]
Psychology Today 117, reprinted in (1975), 15 Jurimetrics J. 188.
205 Devlin Report, supra note 185, at 76, para. 4.25. Also see R. v. Harrison (No. 3)
(1952), 2 W.W.R. (N.S.) 318, 100 C.C.C. 143, 12 C.R. 314 (B.C.C.A.), for an example of
a case in which there were no surrounding inculpatory circumstances.
200 R. v. Sutton, [1970] 2 O.R. 358 at 368, [1970] 3 C.C.C. 152 at 162, 9 C.R.N.S.
45 at 56 (C.A.).
207 See note 187, supra.
208 Supra note 185.
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risk of wrong conviction. It arises because the value of such evidence is excep-
tionally difficult to assess; the witness who has sincerely convinced himself and
whose sincerity carries conviction is not infrequently mistaken. '200
Should out-of-court identifications be admissible? An in-court identifica-
tion is particularly suspect. It is in effect a leading question, the answer to
which is suggested by the circumstances. If there is any similarity between the
accused and the person the witness saw commit the offence, the witness natu-
rally tends to identify the accused as the offender. An out-of-court identifica-
tion made before the "suggestions of others and the circumstances of trial may
have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind"210 is to
be preferred. Certainly, the reliability of an out-of-court identification depends
upon the circumstances and all procedures are subject to some objections, but
it is this identification, rather than that given in court, that should be evaluated
by the court. The Devlin Report concluded that, in the absence of any alterna-
tive suggestions, they were "bound to regard the identification parade as still
the fairest and most practical test available of a person's ability to recognise
a face previously seen."211 The Report recommends that "[i]dentification on
parade or in some other similar way in which the witness takes the initiative
in picking out the accused should be made a condition precedent to identifica-
tion in court, the fulfilment of the condition to be dispensed with only when
the holding of a parade would have been impracticable or unnecessary. '212
Thus, the out-of-court identification is not only admitted as substantive evi-
dence, but in most cases it is a necessary condition of conviction.
This paper will examine the issue of identification evidence in criminal
proceedings from both an English and a Canadian perspective. First, the current
rule in Canada and England will be described, and then reform of that rule
will be discussed. The Ontario Law Reform Commission is silent on the issue
of identification evidence, but the Law Reform Commission of Canada recom-
mendation that prior statements of a witness be admissible as substantive evi-
dence would admit out-of-court identifications.
2. Current Rule
a) England
A prior out-of-court identification by a witness who identifies the accused
at trial is admissible. Prior to R. v. Osborne, R. v. Virtue,213 the leading English
209 Devlin Report, id. at 149, s. 8.1.
210 People v. Gould, 354 P. 2d 865 (Cal. S.C. 1960). See Clemons v. U.S., 408 F.
2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1968): "We think that the rationale behind the exclusion of hearsay
evidence has little force in the case of witnesses, such as those here involved, who are
available for cross-examination. We also think that juries in criminal cases, before being
called upon to decide the awesome question of guilt or innocence, are entitled to know
more of the circumstances which culminate in a courtroom identification-an event
which, standing alone, often means very little to a conscientious and intelligent juror,
who routinely expects the witnesses to identify the defendant in court and who may not
attach great weight to such an identification in the absence of corroboration."
211 Devlin Report, supra note 185, at 114, para. 5.31.
212 Id. at 150, para. 8.7.
213 [1973] 1 All E.R. 649 (C.A.); see Gooderson, Alibi (London: Heinemann
Educational Books Ltd., 1977) at 186-244.
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authority was R. v. Christie.' 14 The five-year-old victim of an indecent assault
identified the accused at trial, but was not asked whether he had previously
identified the accused. The mother of the victim and a policeman gave evidence
that the victim had identified the accused at the time of the arrest. The majority
were of the opinion that the victim's statements were admissible as statements
made in the presence of the accused, but Viscount Haldane also stated:
Had the boy [the eye-witness-victim] after he had identified the accused in the dock,
been asked if he had identified the accused in the field as the man who assaulted
him, and answered affirmatively, then that fact might also have been proved by the
policeman and the mother who saw the identification. Its relevancy is to shew that
the boy was able to identify at the time and to exclude the idea that the identification
of the prisoner in the dock was an afterthought or a mistake.215
Thus, Viscount Haldane thought that the prior identification was only admis-
sible to support an in-court identification. The Court of Appeal in R. v.
Osborne, R. v. Virtue disagreed with this statement of the rule and held that
in England a prior identification of a witness is admissible even if the witness
does not identify the accused in court. The Court of Appeal admitted as sub-
stantive evidence the prior identifications of two witnesses: the first, who could
not remember identifying anyone at the identity parade and did not adopt the
prior identification, and the second, who gave confusing and contradictory
evidence, finally stating that she did not think that the accused was the man
that she had picked out. The second witness admitted making the previous
identification, but did not say whether it was correct. The prior identifications
were admissible. Lawton L.J. concluded:
It is pertinent to point out that in 1914 when the House of Lords came to consider
R. v. Christie the modern practice of identity parades did not exist. The whole
object of identity parades is for the protection of the suspect, and what happens
at those parades is highly relevant to the establishment of the truth. It would
be wrong, in the judgment of this court, to set up artificial rules of evidence,
which hinder the administration of justice. 210
b) Canada
(1) Prior Identifications: To Support Credibility
Canadian courts do not discuss whether prior identifications consistent
with the in-court testimony of a witness are admissible, but rather assume that
they are, and admit them without any discussion. 217 In R. v. Howarth, Gale
C.J.O., in dismissing an appeal that the trial judge failed to direct the jury
214 [1914] A.C. 545 (H.L.).
215 Id. at 551.
216 R. v. Osborne, R. v. Virtue, supra note 213, at 657.
217 Some examples of the admission of prior identifications without discussion are:
R. v. Bagley (1926), 37 B.C.R. 353, [1926] 3 D.L.R. 717, [1926] 2 W.W.R. 513, 46
C.C.C. 257 (C.A.); R. v. Baldwin (1944), 82 C.C.C. 15 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Harrison,
supra note 205; Ayles v. The Queen (1956), 8 D.L.R. (2d) 399, 119 C.C.C. 38
(N.S.C.A.); R. v. Sutton, supra note 206; R. v. Spatola, [1970] 3 O.R. 74, [1970] 4 C.C.C.
241, 10 C.R.N.S. 143 (C.A.) (photograph identified); R. v. Dean, [1942] O.R. 3, [1942]
1 D.L.R. 702 (C.A.); R. v. Olbey, [1971] 3 O.R. 225, 4 C.C.C. (2d) 103 C.A.); R. v.
Smith, [1952] O.R. 432, 103 C.C.C. 58, 14 C.R. 304 (C.A.); Nepton v. The Queen
(1971), 15 C.R.N.S. 145 (Qu6. C.A.); R. v. Smith (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 289 (C.A.).
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properly on the frailties of identification evidence, notes: "Further, Mrs. Mady,
the identifying witness, picked out the accused in a line-up without hesitation,
and no attack is made upon the form or circumstances of that line-up or the
identification made from it. ' '2 18
Instead of discussing the admissibility of the prior identification, courts
proceed to a consideration of the circumstances surrounding that identification.
In R. v. Goldhar, Robertson C.J.O. stated:
The other matter upon which we desire to make observation is the evidence of
identification obtained by what is commonly called a 'line-up.' No doubt strong
evidence of identification may sometimes be obtained by this method. It would
be well, however, if in the evidence at the trial the procedure followed on the
occasion of the line-up were described in more detail than is usually done."19
The court will reject an identification made in a line-up conducted in a manner
that suggests that the accused is the principal suspect.22 0 The courts empha-
size that care must be taken to secure an unbiased identification. It has been
held that it is "highly improper to exhibit a photograph or photographs to
see whether the intended witness is able to identify the person already under
arrest, and whom they are afterwards going to see in person in a line-up." '-2'
In R. v. Sutton, the witness was shown a photograph of the accused before
the line-up in which the witness identified the accused as the offender."-'
218 (1970), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 546 at 548, 13 C.R.N.S. 329 at 331 (Ont. C.A.).
219R. v. Goldhar, R. v. Smokier, [1941] 2 D.L.R. 480 at 480-81, 76 C.C.C. 270 at
271 (Ont. C.A.); in R. v. Smith (N.S.C.A.), supra note 217, MacDonald J.A. examined
a photograph of the line-up and concluded that the construction of the line-up was un-
satisfactory, but despite this the identification was of sufficient weight to support the
conviction; also see R. v. Cosgrove (No. 2), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 100 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Olbey, supra note 217; R. v. Armstrong (1959), 29 W.W.R. (N.S.) 141, 125 C.C.C.
56, 31 C.R. 127 (B.C.C.A.) (in the line-up were six men, all of whom except the ac-
cused were occidentals); R. v. Dean, supra note 217; R. v. Opalchuk (1958), 122 C..C.
85 (Ont. Co. Ct.); Wall, supra note 185, at 52-53; U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 at 232-
33, 87 S. Ct. 1926 at 1935 (1967); and Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 at 383,
88 S. Ct. 967 at 971 (1968).220 Sommer v. The Queen (1958), 29 C.R. 357 (Qu6. Q.B.). Also see R. v.
Opalchuk, id. at 92; R. v. Watson, [1944] 2 D.L.R. 801 at 803, [1944] O.W.N. 258 at
260, 81 C.C.C. 212 at 215 (C.A.). The leading authority is R. v. Dvyer, [1925] 2 K.B.
799 per Lord Hewart C.J.; in R. v. Bagley, supra note 217, at 362 (B.C.R.), 724
(D.L.R.), 519 (W.W.R.), 264 (C.R.), the Court discusses the procedure to be followed
in identifying the offender from a photograph; R. v. Baldwin, supra note 217; R. v.
Smierciak, [1946] O.W.N. 871 at 872, [1947] 2 D.L.R. 156 at 157, 87 C.C.C. 175 at 177,
2 C.R. 434 at 436 (C.A.), discusses the impropriety of showing a single photograph to
the witness: "If a witness has no previous knowledge of the accused person, so as to
make him familiar with that person's appearance, the greatest care ought to be used to
ensure the absolute independence and freedom of judgment of the witness. His recogni-
tion ought to proceed without suggestion, assistance or bias, created directly or indirectly.
... Anything which tends to convey to a witness that a person is suspected by the
authorities, or is charged with an offence, is obviously prejudicial and wrongful. Sub-
mitting a prisoner alone for scrutiny after arrest is unfair and unjust. Likewise, permit-
ting a witness to see a single photograph of a suspected person or of a prisoner, after
arrest and before scrutiny, can have no other effect, in my opinion, than one of prejudice
to such a person."
221 R. v. Watson, id. at 803 (D.L.R.), 260 (O.W.N.), 215 (C.C.C.).
2= Supra note 206.
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The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have drawn
this to the attention of the jury and that a failure to do so entitled the
accused to a new trial. In R. v. Goldhar, Robertson C.J.O. said "there is always
the risk that thereafter the person who has seen the photograph will have
stamped upon his memory the face he has seen in the photograph, rather than
the face he saw on the occasion of the crime.
- 23
An unsupported in-court identification is considered by the courts to be
of doubtful reliability and, in the absence of other incriminating evidence or a
physical description,'22 4 may be of insufficient weight to convict. In R. v.
Gardner, Avory J. stated:
The case of Hancox is on a different footing. The only evidence of identification
was that of witnesses who said they saw him coming away from the neighbour-
hood of the cottage carrying a bag. Not one of them had an opportunity of
picking him out from a number of other men. Each of them saw him for the
first time after that day in the dock. It is impossible to say that any jury would
have been justified in convicting him on that evidence alone.225
The prior identification may be proved by the eye-witness or by a person
who saw the prior identification taking place. In R. v. McGuire, testimony of
a police officer as to the prior identification of the accused by the witness at a
line-up was admitted.220 The court would also have admitted testimony by
police officers as to identifications made by two other witnesses if these wit-
nesses had made an in-court identification. In R. v. Sutton, police officers testi-
fied that the witness made a tentative identification of the accused from a
photograph.227
(2) Prior Identifications; Substantive Evidence
Viscount Haldane, in R. v. Christie, was of the view that a prior identifica-
tion was admissible "to exclude the idea that the identification of the prisoner
in the dock was an afterthought or a mistake. '228 Whether a prior identification
is only admissible to support credibility or is also substantive evidence is not
of importance when the witness makes an in-court identification and this issue
is, therefore, rarely discussed. In Canada, a recent authority that does raise
the issue is R. v. McGuire, in which evidence of a prior identification was ad-
223 Supra note 219, at 480 (D.L.R.), 271 (C.C.C.).
224 In R. v. Browne (1951), 1 W.W.R. (N.S.) 449, 99 C.C.C. 141, 11 C.R. 297
(B.C.C.A.), the first identification by the witness was at trial. O'Halloran J.A. stated,
at 455 (W.W.R.), 147 (C.C.C.), 302 (C.R.): "Unless the witness is able to testify with
confidence what characteristics and what 'something' has stirred and clarified his memory
or recognition, then an identification confined to 'that is the man,' standing by itself,
cannot be more than a vague general description and is untrustworthy in any sphere of
life where certitude is essential." Also see R. v. Harrison, supra note 205; R. v. Smith
(Ont. C.A.), supra note 217. Although the witness had picked the accused out in a
beverage room, the inability to support the identification with a description resulted in
the quashing of the conviction.
225 (1915), 80 J.P. 135 at 136, 114 L.T.R. 78 at 79 (C.A.).
-2 (1975), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 385.
227 Supra note 206.
228 Supra note 214, at 551.
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mitted to support the credibility of an in-court identification.2 '0 Two other
witnesses, who had previously identified the accused, denied in court that the
accused was the killer. The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the
prior identifications of these witnesses were only admissible as inconsistent
statements to impeach credibility and, since the witnesses had not been found
by the trial judge to be adverse, the statements were not admissible. Robertson
J.A. quotes with approval a passage from Wigmore, in which it is stated that
the admission of prior identifications is based on the same reasoning as the
reception of statements to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication:
The psychology of the situation [a prior identification] is practically the same as
when recent contrivance is alleged. To corroborate the witness, therefore, it is
entirely proper to prove that at a former time, when the suggestions of others
could not have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind,
he recognized and declared the present accused to be the person. If, moreover
(as sometimes is done) the person was then so placed among others that all
probability of suggestion (by seeing him handcuffed, for example) is still further
removed, the evidence becomes stronger. 230
The in-court identification is of little weight because "after all that has inter-
vened, it would seldom happen that the witness would not come to believe
in the person's identity," and there is an implication that circumstances
occurring after the event have created a "fancied recognition" in the wit-
ness's mind. Robertson J.A. concludes that an in-court identification "may
be supported by evidence that the person had identified the accused on an
earlier occasion. ' '"31
3. Reform
a) In-Court Identification
A prior identification by a witness consistent with an in-court identification
should be substantive evidence. It is a fiction to say that a prior identifica-
tion supports the credibility of the witness making an in-court identification. In
this situation, the in-court identification is essentially a statement such as:
"That is the man I identified earlier." The most probative identification is one
made soon after the event before any particular suspect has been suggested
to the witness.
The admission of prior identifications as substantive evidence when there
is an in-court identification will have little effect on current practices. Admission
as substantive evidence will require an assessment of the reliability of the prior
identification, and Canadian courts currently engage in such an examination.
Recognition of the fact that the out-of-court identification is the most
229 Supra note 226. Also see R. v. Pelletier (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 266 at 275
(B.C.C.A.). The defendant argued that the trial judge should have directed the jury
that evidence of a prior identification was not substantive evidence, but only supported
the credibility of the witness. Bull J.A. concluded that in the circumstances the jury
could not have failed to conclude that the prior statement "involved nothing more than
the credibility of [the witness]."
230 Wigmore, supra note 5, Vol. IV (1972) at 277, 11130.
231 R. v. McGuire, supra note 226, at 391.
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probative will encourage the courts to develop criteria for evaluating the
reliability of these identifications. In the United States, one model direction
to the jury on identification evidence stresses, among other factors, the cir-
cumstances surrounding any out-of-court identification, such as whether the
prior identification "was the product of his [the witness's] own recollection,"
and "the length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and
the next opportunity of the witness to see [the] defendant." ' 2 Criteria for a
"fair" line-up can be made explicit. One test to evaluate the fairness of a
line-up is to examine a photograph of it. The persons in a line-up have been
referred to as "distractions." The object is to "distract the witness from the
suspect so that the witness will not pick the suspect automatically, ''33 and,
therefore, the distractions should have physical characteristics similar to those
of the suspect. The Devlin Report recommended that it be a practice to take
one black and white photograph of the line-up which the jury could use to
judge "whether or not the suspect stands out. 23 4 The usefulness of a photo-
graph is illustrated by the results of empirical studies. Doob and Kirshenbaum
have found that a witness, in his effort to be a good witness, is committed
to the first description given to the police and will tend to identify someone
who fits that description. 235 The photograph of the line-up can be tested to
determine whether the suspect is unique in possessing a trait mentioned in
the description.
b) No In-Court Identification
If the eye-witness cannot make an in-court identification, is a prior out-
of-court identification admissible? May another witness give evidence that
the eye-witness previously identified the accused? Since there is no in-court
testimony, the rules on consistent statements of a witness do not apply. Are
there other rules that permit the introduction of the prior identification? While
the answer to this question is outside the scope of this paper, a brief discussion
is necessary for completeness. Three situations in which there is no in-court
identification must be distinguished. In the first case, the witness, who cannot
identify the accused because he does not remember the perpetrator, states that
the prior identification is true. In the second case, the witness also cannot
identify the accused because he does not remember the perpetrator, but in
addition he is unwilling or unable to say that the prior identification is true.
He may deny its truth, deny that it was made, or claim no memory of the
statement. For example, in R. v. Osborne, one witness said that she did not
remember picking anyone out of the line-up. 236 In the third case, the witness
has a memory of the perpetrator, but he denies in court that the accused is
that person. With regard to the prior identification, the witness will either
deny its truth, deny that it was made, or claim no memory of the state-
ment. For the purposes of the following discussion, the last two cases will be
232 U.S. v. Telfaire, 469 F. 2d 552 at 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972); also see U.S. v.
Zeiler, 470 F. 2d 717 (3d Cir. 1972).
233 Doob and Kirshenbaum, supra note 197, at 289.
234 Devlin Report, supra note 185, paras. 5.46-5.48, 8.15.
235 Supra note 197.
236 Supra note 213.
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grouped together, since in both cases the witness casts doubt on the prior
identification. 23 7
(1) No In-Court Identification-The Witness Adopts the Prior Identification
A witness who cannot identify the accused at trial may adopt a record
of a prior identification that meets the criteria for a document that may be used
to refresh memory.238 The witness need not have a present memory of the
person identified, but the witness must state under oath that at the time the prior
identification was made he or she believed it to be true. In Fleming v. Toronto
Railway Co., the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a witness who had no
memory of the event could adopt a report made contemporaneously with the
event. Meredith J.A. said:
If looking at the report, the witness could have said, "That is my report, it refers
to the car in question, and shews that it was examined at that time, and, though
I cannot from memory say that it was then examined, I can now swear that it was
because I signed no report that was untrue, and at the time I signed this report
I knew that it was true," that would, of course, be very good evidence, but the
defendants were not allowed to get that far; and so the defendants are entitled
to a new trial.239
Adoption of a prior identification is clearly supported by authority, but
the question that remains open is whether the record of the prior identification
must satisfy the criteria for documents used to refresh memory.2 40 Must the
record of the prior identification be a writing made contemporaneously with
the event and either verified or recorded by the declarant?
237 There may also be a distinction between groups two and three on the basis of
whether there is inconsistency between the prior statement and the in-court statement
for the purposes of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10, s. 9. In R. v.
Gtushue (No. 4) (1975), 30 C.R.N.S. 178 at 180-81 (Ont. Co. Ct.), Graburn Co. Ct.
J. concluded: "nor is it necessary for me to decide ... whether, [under s. 9(2) of the
Canada Evidence Act] when a witness indicates he cannot remember, or has no recol-
lection whether something was said in a positive way at some other time, it can be
considered to be evidence inconsistent with his present testimony." Also see California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 at 169, 90 S. Ct. 1930 at 1941, n. 18 (1970). The Supreme
Court of Canada, in Mclnroy v. The Queen, supra note 38, at 623 (D.L.R.), 141
(C.R.), held that a finding of the trial judge that a witness who claims to have no
memory of the events is lying constitutes "evidence of an inconsistency between what
she [the witness] said at the trial, i.e., that she had no recollection of a conversation, and
what was contained in her written statement, i.e., a detailed recollection of it."
2 3 8 R. v. Davey, supra note 1; R. v. McLean (1967), 52 Cr. App. R. 80; Wigmore,
sttpra note 5, Vol. III (1970) at 78, f735; cf. Jones v. Metcalfe, [1967] 3 All E.R. 205
where Lord Parker C.J. suggests that the police officer could have been called to prove
a number told him by a witness with no present memory. Cattermole v. Millar, [1977]
Crim. L. Rev. 553 (Q.B. Div. Ct.), follows the decision in R. v. McLean. The Court
held that the evidence of a witness that she told a certain licence number to a police
officer cannot be combined with evidence that the officer recorded the number to estab-
lish the observation of the licence number.
2'39 Supra note 1, at 325-26; R. v. Inhabitants of St. Martin's, Leicester (1834), 2
Ad. & E. 210, 111 E.R. 81. The term used in the United States to refer to statements
adopted by a witness who has no memory of events is "past recollection recorded." This
term was approved by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Rouse, [1977]
4 W.W.R. 734. Also see Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, Rule 803(5),
"Recorded Recollection."
240 See, for example, R. v. Gwozdowski, supra note 1; Phipson on Evidence (11th
ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1970) at 632-33, art. 1528.
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There is some authority indicating that a prior identification that is
adopted by the witness need not meet these criteria. In 1847, in R. v. Burke,
the witness could not identify the accused at trial, but said that at the police
station he had identified the person who committed the offence, and that he
was certain that he had identified the right person.241 The Court permitted
other witnesses to be called to prove that the accused was the same person
identified on the earlier occasion. This case also illustrates the point that the
adopted statement is substantive evidence of the facts asserted. In R. v. Moir,
the witness who could not identify the accused at trial made a prior identifica-
tion of the accused to the police.2 42 The witness did not adopt the prior identifi-
cation at trial, but Morden J. indicates that it would have been possible for her
to do so, although he does not state that the prior identification was in a record
verified by the witness.
Two recent cases in British Columbia on the definition of hearsay also
support the proposition that the criteria for a document to refresh memory
will not be required in every case. In R. v. Penno, the British Columbia Court
of Appeal permitted the recorder of a statement by a declarant who could not
remember the contents of the statement to testify as to that statement although
the declarant had not verified the record.243 The issue was the ownership of
property found in the possession of the accused. The Crown called two em-
ployees of the alleged owner to prove that the inventory numbers on the
property found in the possession of the accused were the same as the inventory
numbers on the property of the alleged owner. One employee, the declarant,
had read off the inventory numbers, and the second employee had recorded
the numbers on an inventory sheet. Apparently the declarant could not remem-
ber the numbers at trial, but testified that she had correctly stated the numbers.
The Court permitted the second clerk to testify as to the numbers. The Court
reasoned that the testimony of the second clerk was admissible because it was
not hearsay, and did not discuss the rules on refreshing memory. It held that
it was not hearsay since the clerk was not asserting the truth of the observations
by the declarant, but was merely testifying that certain words were uttered
by the witness.
Technically, the testimony as to the inventory numbers by the recorder
was hearsay. The fact that the declarant dictated a number to the clerk is only
relevant as evidence of what the declarant observed. It is an assertion that
241 (1847), 2 Cox C.C. 295.
242 (1974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 305 (Ont. H.C.); see R. v. Harvey (1918), 42 O.L.R.
187, 30 C.C.C. 160 (S.C.). The testimony is confusing. Although the accused at one
point testified that his previous identification was correct, it appears at trial that he knew
that the man he had identified was the accused, but that he was now uncertain that the
accused was the guilty person. At the conclusion of his testimony, the witness was able
to say that "to the best of my knowledge he is the man" and the Court held that there
was some evidence to go to the jury.
243 [1977] 3 W.W.R. 361 (B.C.C.A.); see also R. v. Degelman, unreported, May
25, 1977 (B.C.C.A.); cf. R. v. Davey, supra note I; and R. v. McLean, supra note 238.
See Ashworth, The Manacle of the Hearsay Rule: 1. Proving that Goods are Stolen
(1977), 141 Justice of the Peace 714; The Manacle of the Hearsay Rule: 2. Establishing
a Past Observation (1977), 141 Justice of the Peace 728; Libling, Evidence of Past
Identification, [1977) Crim. L. Rev. 268.
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the declarant saw these particular numbers, and, if the numbers are inaccurate,
the Crown has failed to prove its case. It is a technical infringement, however,
since the possibility of error is minimal. The statement is stored in a written
record and not in the memory of the declarant. The principal source of error
is deception by the declarant, and any motive to deceive can be explored on
cross-examination.
If one extends the reasoning in Penno to all records of out-of-court
statements, the rules on documents that may be used to refresh memory are
superfluous. A recorder of a statement could testify as to what was said by a
declarant with first hand knowledge in order to complete the testimony of the
declarant. The conditions of admissibility in Penno are that both the recorder
and the declarant testify and that the record be made contemporaneously with
the statement. A person who recorded an identification by the declarant could
testify as to that identification even if the declarant could not identify the
accused at trial and had not verified the record.
This result is theoretically correct. A record of a prior identification should
be admissible even if there is no in-court identification by the declarant as a
witness at trial. In this situation, there are external circumstances that indicate
the correctness of the recorder's memory of the declarant's statement. The
accuracy of the recording goes to the point not of the identity of the guilty
actor with the accused, but of identity of the person identified with the
accused.244 On this point a most thorough examination is possible and there
is usually no dispute. The previous identification that is conducted under
the proper conditions is more reliable than the in-court testimony.
(2) No In-Court Identification: The Witness Does Not Adopt the Prior
Identification
In England, a prior identification made by a witness is admissible as
substantive evidence even if the witness does not identify the accused at trial
and does not adopt the prior identification as true.245 The United States Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1) (c) admits prior statements of a witness of
"identification of a person made after perceiving him. '240 The identification
is admissible even if there is no in-court identification or if the in-court identi-
fication is inconsistent with the prior identification. As in England, the prior
identification is admitted as substantive evidence, but admissibility is subject
to the requirements of the United States Constitution.2 47 A violation of a
defendant's right to counsel at a post-indictment line-up will make the identifi-
244 Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory (1927), 40
Harv. L. Rev. 712 at 725-26.
245 R. v. Osborne, R. v. Virtue, supra note 213.
246 Pub. L. No. 94-113, 89 Stat. 576 (Oct. 6, 1975). Rothstein, Evidence Workshop:
Federal Rule on Prior Witness Statements Changes Criminal Practice (1978), 14 Crim.
L. Bull. 140. For a review of recent decisions on identification evidence, see The
United States Courts of Appeals: 1976-1977 Term Criminal Law and Procedure (1977),
66 Geo. L.J. 203 at 324.
247 U.S. v. Wade, supra note 219; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct,
1951 (1967).
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cation inadmissible.248 The Fourteenth Amendment due process standard of
fundamental fairness protects a defendant against an identification that is the
result of suggestion or is made in circumstances conducive to mistake.249 A
procedure that has been found to be "impermissibly suggestive" involves show-
ing the witness a picture of the accused before a line-up is conducted.250 An
identification obtained by suggestive procedures is not per se inadmissible.
Rather, the court examines whether the totality of the circumstances indicates
that the identification is reliable.251 Thus, the due process standard ensures
that only identifications above a threshold level of reliability are admissible as
substantive evidence.
Detailed discussion of the rationale for admitting prior identifications
when there is no in-court identification or an adoption of a prior identification,
as is provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, is beyond the scope of this
paper. In this case, the prior identification supplements the in-court testimony
and, therefore, questions different from those considered in deciding whether
to admit consistent statements must be answered. The principal questions are:
first, to what extent should a party be permitted to supplement the testimony
of a forgetful, confused or hostile witness; second, what rights should an
accused have to a full, effective cross-examination of the witness; 252 and third,
is there sufficient information to enable the trier of fact to evaluate correctly
the prior out-of-court statement? While these factors will not be discussed here,
suffice it to say that perhaps the reliability of a prior identification meets all
objections raised by these three questions. As has been pointed out, the prior
identification is the best evidence available. There is more information on the
reliability of the prior identification than on the in-court identification. With
248 There is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in confrontations held before
formal initiation of adversary judicial proceedings: Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 at
689-90 (1972).
24 9 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243 (1977).
25 Id.
2 51 The Manson court adopted the following five factors enunciated in Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 at 199-200, 93 S. Ct. 375 at 382 (1972), as quoted in U.S. v.
Medina, 552 F. 2d 181 (Ill. Ct. App. 7th Cir. 1977) at 190: "(1) the opportunity of
the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention; (3) the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated at the confrontation; and (5) the time between the crime and the confron-
tation." The court is only required to consider these factors if the defendant shows that
the identification procedure used was "impermissibly suggestive." See Manson, id. at
2250-54; Medina at 189-90.
252 See California v. Green, supra note 237, at 157-58 (U.S.), 1934 (S. Ct.), for
a discussion of the reasons for the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to be con-
fronted with the witness testifying against him:
The particular vice that gave impetus to the confrontation claim was the practice
of trying defendants on 'evidence' which consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or
depositions secured by the examining magistrates, thus denying the defendant the
opportunity to challenge his accuser in a face-to-face encounter in front of the
trier of fact. Prosecuting attorneys "would frequently allege matters which the
prisoner denied and called upon them to prove. The proof was usually given by
reading depositions, confessions of accomplices, letters, and the like; and this
occasioned frequent demands by the prisoner to have his 'accusers' i.e. the wit-
nesses against him, brought before him face to face."
Also see Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: Macmillan and
Co., 1883) at 326.
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respect to the right of the accused to confront his accuser with meaningful
questions, the issue is whether the prior identification is as reliable as statements
admitted under exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as dying declarations
against interest. Since these hearsay statements are admissible, although the
accused does not have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness, a reliable
prior identification by a witness that is subject to subsequent cross-examination
should be admissible.253
4. Description
a) Current Practice
The admissibility of the original description has not been examined by
Canadian courts; rather, it has been assumed that the description is admissible.
Several judgments refer to the original description.254 The Ontario Court of
Appeal, in R. v. Audy (No. 2), notes that one basis of the defendant's claim
that the identification evidence was so unsound that it was unsafe to permit
the conviction to stand was the "conflicting descriptions given to the police
by the eyewitness shortly after the robbery occurred. 12 55 In R. v. Olbey, the
trial judge in his charge to the jury points out that the witness had given a
description identical to her in-court description to the police before she had
any opportunity to see the accused. 256 In R. v. Sutton, Jessup J.A. notes that
the witness "provided the police with a detailed description including the
features that the man had a reddish goatee on the chin only, wore black suede
253 See, for example, U.S. v. Bailey, 439 F. Supp. 1303 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1977), which
held admissible a written statement by a declarant, although he did not testify. The
Court, at 1305, applied Federal Rule 804(b)(5), which admits hearsay statements not
admissible under other sections if the statement is "more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts" and "the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence." The Court concluded,
at 1308:
The hearsay exception sub judice is clearly as reliable as other forms of hearsay
which satisfy the Confrontation Clause absent any opportunity for cross examina-
tion. Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 15 S. Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 2d 409 (1895) (Dying
Declaration); U.S. v. Kelly, 349 F. 2d 720, 770 (2d Cir. 1965) (Past Recollection
Recorded). If dying declarations may be admitted despite the Confrontation
Clause, so should the reliable hearsay of Stewart, especially where Stewart would
be deemed "unavailable."
254 In R. v. Smith (N.S.C.A.), supra note 217, the defendant argued that since the
witness had not told the police of a distinguishing mark prior to identifying the accused
in a line-up, the identification evidence was too weak and uncertain to found a convic-
tion. The appeal division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that the delay in
giving the description does go to the weight of the evidence, but in the circumstances
of this case there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty. Gooderson, supra
note 5, at 77, observes that in the first trial of Adolf Beck a witness was permitted to
testify as to the description she had given the police referring to a distinguishing mark
below the perpetrator's jaw. In R. v. Spatola, supra note 217, at 82 (O.R.), 249 (C.C.C.),
153 (C.R.N.S.), Laskin J.A. (as he then was) noted the importance of distinguishing
marks that "are noticed and later verified" [emphasis added]; in R. v. Babb, [1972]
1 W.W.R. 705 at 710, 17 C.R.N.S. 366 at 371 (B.C.C.A.), Branca J.A. concludes:
"[With the fact that his [the witness's] original description of the transvestite was fairly
general in character and the weaknesses that developed in cross-examination, the diffi-
culty of accepting the identification becomes a little more obvious."
255 (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 231 at 236 (Ont. C.A.).
256 Supra note 217, at 229 (O.R.), 107 (C.C.C.).
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shoes and had a word which looked like 'Love' tattooed across the knuckles
of one hand. '257 The trial judge had failed to direct the jury that the identifica-
tion by the witness may have been affected by the police bringing to her
attention a photograph of the accused before the line-up. Jessup J.A. ordered
a new trial noting, however, that "it would ... have been quite proper and
desirable for the learned trial Judge to point out to the jury that the goatee
and the tattoo marks in particular were unusual features which would lend
themselves to a vivid impression on the recollection of a witness.
258
The original description is a prior out-of-court statement that is consistent
with the testimony of the accused. It would clearly be a hearsay statement if
it were admitted as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted. Although it is
not discussed in the cases, it appears that the description is admitted to support
the witness's in-court identification. In R. v. Spatola, Laskin J.A. (as he then
was), in deciding that in this case the trial judge should have directed the jury
concerning the frailties of the identification evidence, pointed out that the
witness had known the accused prior to the incident and "previous to being
shown the photographs [including one of the accused] had given a detailed
description of appellant as to height, clothing and such distinctive features as
sideburns and a goatee. '2 59 The original description supported the quality of
the identification.
Canadian courts note the importance of consistency between a physical
description and the physical characteristics of the accused. O'Halloran J.A.
in R. v. Harrison thought that:
A generalized statement by a witness "that is the man," cannot be accepted as
a substitute for a trustworthy statement of physical characteristics. A witness can
say "that is the man," only if it is founded on physical features, characteristics,
traits or mannerisms which the witness is able to describe, and which when reliably
described are peculiar to accused, and are not common in a populous area to
many people who could easily have been at the place at the time.260
It is not clear whether the description referred to includes the original
description, but one would assume that it does, given the many cases that
admit the original description. The original description made before any
suggestion that the accused is suspected is better evidence than an in-court
description based on present recollection in the presence of the accused.
b) Reform
A prior description is logically probative on the issue of the accuracy of
the identification. Although it has been shown that witnesses generally have
difficulty in describing people accurately even when they are looking at them
and, therefore, it is possible for a witness who cannot describe the perpetrator
or gives a description that does not fit the suspect to make an accurate identi-
fication, the absence of a description or an inaccurate description can provide
257 Supra note 206, at 359 (O.R.), 154 (C.C.C.), 46 (C.R.N.S.).
2 581d. at 368 (O.R.), 162 (C.C.C.), 56 (C.R.N.S.).
259 Supra note 217, at 78 (O.R.), 245 (C.C.C.), 148 (C.R.N.S.). Aylesworth J.A.
notes, at 75 (O.R.), 242 (C.C.C.), 145 (C.R.N.S.), that the witness "was cross-examined
in detail and at length before the jury on every aspect of his identification and of what
he had said about it previously."
2 6OSupra note 205, at 320 (W.W.R.), 145 (C.C.C.), 316 (C.R.).
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valuable information, particularly if there is a serious discrepancy or an
omission of an obvious physical characteristic of the suspect who is later
identified.261 In the English case of R. v. Turnbull, Lord Widgery lists as a
criterion of the quality of the identification whether there was "any material
discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the
witness when first seen by them and his actual appearance. '202 He also advises
that, in all cases in which the defence asks for particulars of the description,
the Crown should provide them.
The Devlin Report recommended that a description by an identifying
witness "given to the police at the first convenient opportunity, and in particular
before the witness has seen the accused again ... or any photograph of him,
or received any description of him from another source" be admissible.20 3 The
description would constitute substantive evidence, but should not "normally
be sufficient by itself to raise the identification from the level of probability to
that of reasonable certainty.' 2 4 Strangely, the Devlin Report would require
that the description should be in writing and signed by the witness. 1 An
analogy is drawn with recent complaints of a sexual offence, but neither recent
complaints nor prior identifications need be in writing under the current law.
Any proposal to reform the rules on consistent statements should consider
the admissibility of prior descriptions. The current sub silentio practice should
be stated expressly. There does not appear to be any strong objection to their
admission as substantive evidence since the witness is available for cross-
examination.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the rationale for the exclusion of consistent
statements of a witness and considered alternative rules. The choice is between
a rule that sets up a priori classes of statements that are considered to be
especially relevant and a rule under which the trial judge decides in each case
whether the evidence is sufficiently relevant to justify admission. There is no
obvious "correct" choice. Neither the argument that the evidence is necessary
to reinforce testimony nor that it is superfluous and unnecessary is compelling.
There are costs involved in both exclusion and inclusion. The exclusion of
statements would require a complicated rule that would be difficult to under-
stand and administer, e.g., the common law. Admission of all statements,
while simple, might result in costly and unnecessary court delays.
One may decide that the reinforcement value of consistent statements is
not a sufficient reason for their admission. An a priori exclusionary rule may
be chosen to avoid the possibility of admitting superfluous information and
causing unnecessary delay. Under an exclusionary rule, statements will be
admissible only if they perform a function in addition to reinforcement, such
as rehabilitation of the witness. Statements to rebut an allegation of recent
261 Wall, supra note 185, at 100.
262 [19761 3 All E.R. 549 at 552.
263 Supra note 185, at 106, para. 5.10.
264 Id. at 107, para. 5.15.
2 6 5 Id. at 151, para. 8.10.
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fabrication were analysed. It was concluded that the California Evidence Code
provision on recent fabrication is to be preferred to the Ontario Draft Act
because it offers a more exhaustive definition of the situations in which a pre-
vious statement would be logically probative. The Ontario Law Reform
Commission recommendation that statements admitted to rebut a suggestion
that evidence has been fabricated be substantive evidence should be adopted,
since the distinction between evidence going to credibility and substantive evi-
dence in this context has little meaning. Consistent statements of an accused
were also examined and it was suggested that any proposal for reform should
study their admission carefully. The exception for complaints in sexual cases
should be abolished. This would eliminate the direction to the jury that an
adverse inference can be drawn from a failure to complain and would make
admissibility of these statements dependent on whether the criteria for another
exception are satisfied. Finally, it was submitted that prior identifications
should be substantive evidence since they are more reliable than in-court
identifications.
On the other hand, there are strong arguments that can be made for the
admission of all consistent statements. While the choice of a rule will be
partly dependent on the assumption that one makes about the ability of judges
and juries to evaluate correctly the probative value of the evidence, it should
be noted that, since in the case of consistent statements the same evidence has
been given in court, the risk of an error in estimation of the probative value
is minimized. Although the choice is also dependent on the ordering of the
conflicting goals of predictability of the evidence that will be admissible and
the admissibility of all relevant information, 266 surprise does not appear to be
a problem under either form of rule. In addition, the trial judge will have a
discretion to exclude evidence of trifling probative value.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has undertaken to reformulate
the common law rules of evidence along "broader lines." Its objective is to
adopt "easily available, clear and flexible rules"'267 based on the premise that
all relevant evidence should be admissible unless there is a "clear justification
for the exclusion of evidence that would assist in arriving at the truth. '268 It is
submitted that in the case of consistent statements no such justification exists
and that they should be one of the circumstances before the jury.
266 A principal criticism of a rule that admits all statements is that it would reduce
the ability of the adversaries to predict what evidence would be admissible. See the reac-
tion of lawyers in the United States to the Model Code in Report of Committee on
Administration of Justice on Model Code of Evidence (1944), 19 J. State Bar of Calif.
262 at 266: "How could any lawyer know how to prepare a case for a plaintiff or
defendant, or advise a client whether he had a cause of action or defense. One judge
might admit evidence offered by a party which it would require quite an effort on the
part of the opposite party to meet and rebut, and yet, if at vast expense he prepared
to do so, his efforts might be a useless expense since the judge might exclude it. How
could any trial counsel in advance of trial know whether evidence which his client
could bring against his opponent, or which the adversary could bring against his client
and which, under present rules, would be excluded as too remote, would be admitted
or excluded by the judge?"
267 Canada Evidence Code, supra note 17, at 30.
2-8 Id. at 32.
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